

The Nature of Evolution:

A Study on the Philosophy of A.M. Iqbal

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Abstract

The nature of human being evolution in the philosophy of Allama Muhammad Iqbal is different from the conception of other modern philosophers. This natural evolution basically springs from the real Love which flourishes in the inner being of an individual.

Love as described by Iqbal is not physical, sexual or biological principle. It is the inward drive of all life to attain to its full maturity and development. It is a primal urge to live, to progress and bring out all the inner wealth and resources of being. Every phenomenon and activity that is not related to this primal urge and does not subserve its purposes, leads to stagnation and decay. He voices strong condemnation of scientific reason, arts and religion when they carve out for themselves autonomous fields of action or set themselves up as independent forces. According to Iqbal, all specialized activity, whether it is intellectual, artistic or religious, is a differentiation of the primal urge which he calls Love and apart from it has no title to independent, autonomous existence.

Iqbal further explains that a philosophy which does not spring from the depth of life is so much empty trash; and thought which is not inspired by love or the will to progress, construct, create and beautify the world is dreading. Similarly a religion without the flame of love of the urge to advance, improve and enrich life is only lifeless ritualism. Disbelief and atheism are as good as Islam, if inflamed by love, while Islam is no better than paganism if it is devoid of Love.

Keywords: *Love, Darwinian, élan vital, Bergson, Emergent Evolution, tamanna , arzu, 'ishq, primal urge .*

A. Introduction

Q Ilama Muhammad Iqbal has nowhere put forward a systematized theory of evolution, but it is possible to piece together from his isolated statements a more or less complete view of evolution as understood by him. It would have been surprising, indeed, if a poet-philosopher of Iqbal's stature, whose thought encompasses almost entire field of modern philosophy, had left us in the dark about his view of a theory which has exercised an ever-widening influence on almost all branches of human knowledge and effected a profound revolution in our modes of thinking. Iqbal's idea of evolution is derived from many sources¹, It gathers up elements the most diverse and mutually opposed to each other, but finds expression in a synthetic unity bearing the stamp of our poet's personality².

The theory of evolution, as propounded by Darwin³, took the religious world by storm. It seemed to sweep away before it the

¹ Iqbal owed to Iran his artistic inspiration and a great deal of his development as a thinker. He was a profound scholar of Persian language and literature and adopted Persian as the medium of expression for some of his most works. He was born in 1877, by this time Persian, which had been the official language of Muslim rule in the subcontinent for a nearly a thousand years, had been replaced by English but it continued to be the language of culture among the Muslims and to a large extent even among the non-Muslim. The Urdu language, which by that time had become the *lingua franca* of the greater part of the subcontinent and the language of the lower courts and the lower echelons of the administration, contained a large proportion of Persian words and phrases. The proportion was so large indeed that it would be difficult to think of Urdu without Persian. Although he had become famous as an Urdu poet much earlier than as a poet of Persian, and in Urdu he is ranked as one of three greatest (the other being Mir and Ghalib) his Persian work is of a more lasting character and has already served to spread his ideas and influence beyond Pakistan, India and the Muslim World. Among Persian poets, Iqbal is most deeply indebted to Jalal al-Din Rumi, (1207-1273), whom he regards as his spiritual guide and preceptor, his *Murshid*. See Mumtaz Hasan, *Tribut to iqbal*, Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1982, p. 73-80.

² Here Iqbal explains his real attitude towards reason and knowledge. He equates life with instinct, appetite, desire, craving, all of which in their higher forms express themselves in man's religious and social ideals and in the dynamic urge to improve and beautify life. This basic drive, this primal urge and dynamic force needs certain instruments for its activity. Therefore, it differentiates itself in thought, imagination, memory and consciousness. Hence knowledge and reason are the servants of man's life-urge and its instruments for self-preservation. See. M. Saeed Sheikh, *Studies in Iqbal's Thought and Art*, selected article from the Quarterly Iqbal, Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1987, in Iqbal's concept of evolution, by Mazher-ud-Din Siddiqi, p. 171.

³ Charles Robert Darwin, (1809-1882), English naturalist who formulated the theory of evolution by natural selection, expounded in *On the Origin of Species* (1859), and applied to man in *The Descent of Man* (1871), his grandfather, Erasmus (1731-1802), English

deeply-cherished faith of millions of human beings, held for long centuries, in the ultimate sanctions of religious morality. For a time the spiritual faith of mankind suffered a recession which appeared final and irrevocable. In vain did the champions of orthodoxy, like Bishop Wilberforce,⁴ direct their attacks and lampoons against this formidable heresy. It not only held its own but completely battered down the defenses built up laboriously by the champions of faith. The triumph of irreligion was complete.

Darwin had, in fact, proved nothing against God or religion, for, as Bertrand Russel has pointed out, even if we take for granted that the evidence of fossilized remains primeval rocks is an indubitable testimony to the slow and progressive evolution of life from its lowest forms and provides convincing disproof of the doctrine of special creation, there is nothing impossible in the world having been created with man in it at a single instant, complete with all sedimentary rocks and fossilized vestiges. Although no one believes that God would play such tricks upon human beings merely to test their faith, yet such creation cannot be dismissed as inherently impossible, if we believe in the omnipotence of God⁵.

The tremendous shock administered by Darwin to religious beliefs, which seemed so impregnable, cannot be ascribed to any inherent irrationality of those beliefs and certainly not to their core and content, but to their intellectual formulations and logical explanations attached to them. In the Preface to his drama, *Back to Methuselah*, Bernard Shaw gives a brilliant exposition of the reasons for the extraordinary popularity achieved by the Darwinian theory

physician and poet; author of *Zoonomia*, or the *Laws of Organic life* (1794-1796), anticipating Lamarck's view on evolution, see Sinclair, JM, *Collin English Dictionary*, Glasgow: HarperCollin Publishers, third ed., 1991.

⁴ Samuel Wilberforce (1805-1873), British Anglican Churchman; bishop of Oxford (1845-1869) and Winchester (1869-1873), His father William (1759-1833), British politician and philanthropist, whose efforts secured the abolition of the slave trade (1807) and of slavery (1833) in the British Empire. see. Sinclair, JM, *Collin English Dictionary*, Glasgow: HarperCollin Publishers, third ed., 1991.

⁵ God has willed that the world, of which Man is the epitome, should objectify the whole content of His Knowledge. Our ceaseless activities arise from the duty of manifesting the Divine consciousness which is the ground of human nature, Jalal al-Din Rumi elaborated in his poetry entitled: *The Purpose of Creation*, Divine Wisdom created the world in order that all things in His Knowledge should be revealed. God laid upon the world the throes of parturition for the purpose of making manifest that which He knew. See R.A. Nicholson, *Rumi; Poet and Mystic*, Suhail Academy: Lahore, 2000, p. 111.

of evolution and the ignominy of the defeat suffered by the protagonists of religion. Shaw says that the mind of European intellectuals was so much oppressed by the notion of an outside creator whose arbitrary will seemed to override every law superimpose itself in a most uncertain manner on the regularity and orderliness of physical causation that the people heaved a sigh of relief when Darwinism eliminated God, Mind and Consciousness from the universe. All the worst and most ghastly features of Darwinism such as the reign of blind chance, the pitiless cannibalism of Nature manifested in the insensate struggle for survival and the picture of a world which thrived on eternal warfare, priding itself on the philosophy of "Devil take the hindmost", were actually received with tumultuous welcome. Darwin pleased all sections of opinion in Western society which had an axe to grind. The war mongers were happy, because Darwin seemed to justify mutual extermination as a legitimate mode of natural selection.

Capitalist exploiters felt at ease when they learned that they were committing no sin in depriving their fellow-men of the profits of hard labor; they were in fact copying merely the normal process of nature. Socialists were pleased, because Darwinism had dispensed with the need of individual and personal reform by ascribing every beneficial change to environmental factors. Such was the enthusiasm evoked by the Darwinian interpretation of natural processes that nobody cared for the utter banishment of mind from the universe affected by Darwin. In the brilliant smile used by Bernard Shaw⁶, Darwin seemed to imply that all the books in the British museum would still have been written, word for word, in exactly the same style and phraseology, even if there were not a single mind in the universe, just as the trees put Forth flowers yield their fruits without the least tinge of consciousness.

Darwin accomplished in the biological and social realms what the physical scientists had done in the world of matter. Teleological causation involving the idea of purposiveness in nature and society

⁶ George Bernard Shaw, often known as GBS, (1856-1950). An Irish Dramatist and critic, in England from 1876. He was an active socialist and became a member of the Fabian Society but his major works are effective as satiric attacks rather than political tracks. These include *Arms and the Man* (1894), *Candida* (1894), *Man and Superman* (1903), *Major Barbara* (1905), *Pygmalion* (1913), *Back to Methuselah* (1921), and *St Joan* (1923): Noble Price for literature 1925. See Sinclair, JM, *Collin English Dictionary*, and Glasgow: HarperCollin Publishers, third ed., 1991.

was given short shrift. Everything happened according to blind chance. All changes were induced by external factors. Natural selection, the key to all biological advance, was an outside agency. The purposes of men and animals, their desires, aspirations and strivings were ineffective in the struggle for survival, because its issue depend on factors over which they had no control and which lay outside of them. These conclusions were uncritically accepted by an age which was proud of its rationality. And yet, closely examined, the Darwinian principle of natural selection justified no such conclusions, nor did furnish the slightest proof of the omnipotence of external factors. If natural selection is likened to a policeman, who guards the door of evolution and knocks down everyone who does not enter with new and better equipment for the strife, even then the secret of evolution will be found not in the obstructing policeman but in the genius and qualities of the individuals who devise the new equipment. In other words, survival does not depend on outside factors, but on the inner qualities of organisms, their faculty for resistance, adaptation, etc. Nature works from within, not from without.

For a long time Darwinian hypotheses seemed so unchallengeably entrenched that no body could doubt their validity, and religious faith seemed to have suffered a permanent setback. Soon however, the tide began to turn. It was felt that the doctrine of external causation, involving, as it did, the repudiation of teleology, was inadequate to explain the phenomena of organic and social life. Lamarck had already stressed the role of desire, striving and co native energy in the process of natural selection. The theme was later resurrected by philosophers and psychologists, like Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, William McDougal and J.C. Smuts. Evolution was viewed in an entirely new perspective which tilted the balance in favor of the religious world view.

The evidence of purposiveness in organic evolution was too strong to be ignored, and it could not be explained on purely mechanical principles or as an effect of external causation. The question arose: Is there, from the biological viewpoint, any initial agency which may serve to explain the constructive work of nature and which we may think of as the cause of those structures whose functional activity is life?

Bergson⁷ sought to trace this agency in the *elan vital*. With him *elan vital* is the basic reality of all beings, the source and ground of evolution, a vital impulse or push or creative flow pervading matter, insinuating itself in it, overcoming its inertia and resistance, and determining the direction of evolution as well as evolution itself. This ever changing free activity is life. The earliest animate forms, tiny masses of protoplasm, were possessed of a tremendous internal push," that was to raise them even to the highest forms of life". The evolution of life is a process that goes on forever by virtue of an initial movement. In his epoch-making work, *creative evolution*, Bergson says:

Whether we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle in order to account for this convergence of effects. Such convergence does not appear possible in the Darwinian and specially the neo-Darwinian theory of insensible accidental variations, nor in the hypothesis of sudden accidental variations.

Lloyd Morgan, whose theory of Emergent Evolution has found wide acceptance, came still nearer to the religious viewpoint when he declared:

Without denying a felt push from the lower levels of one's being-a so-called driving force below- to me it feels like drawing upwards through activity existent at a high level than that to which I have attained. This sounds like Plato's notion of the Deity whom the Greek philosopher conceives of as a magnet pulling all beings towards itself⁸.

⁷ Henri Louis Bergson, (1859-1941), French philosopher, who sought to bridge the gap between metaphysics and science. His main works are: *Memory and Matter* (1896), trans. (1911), and *Creative Evolution* (1907, trans. 1911): Noble Price for literature 1927. Bergsonian is the philosophy of Bergson, which emphasizes duration as the basic element of experience and asserts the existence of a life-giving force that permeates the entire natural order. See Sinclair, JM, *Collin English Dictionary*, Glasgow: HarperCollin Publishers, third ed., 1991. P. 47.

⁸ Neo-Platonism: a philosophical system which was first developed in the 3rd century A.D. as a synthesis of Platonic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian elements, and which although originally opposed to Christianity, later incorporated it. It dominated European thought until the 13th century and re-emerged during the renaissance. Platonism: the teachings of Plato and his followers, especially the philosophical theory that the meanings of general words are real existing abstract entities (Forms) and that particular objects have properties in common by virtue of their relationship with these forms. Compare nominalism conceptualism, intuitionism. see Sinclair, JM, *Collin English Dictionary*, Glasgow: HarperCollin Publishers, third ed., 1991. P. 1193.

Even those evolutionists who would not affirm the existence of a Divine Creator setting the direction of evolution, had to find refuge in the doctrine of an immanent cause of the evolutionary process, thus directly neglecting the Darwinian postulate of an external agency, like the natural selection, determining the pace and trend of evolution. William Morton Wheeler of Harvard University, for example, writing as a biologist, thinks that organization in animals is the work of the components of the organism and that it is not directed by extra-spatial and extra-temporal "entelechies" or organizing factors, or *elan vital*, or any metaphysical agency. The organizing agency or tendency is immanent, not transcendent. Wheeler himself is an ardent supporter of the theory of Emergent Evolution and it is interesting to learn that this view does not necessarily suppose the existence of any transcendental agencies. But why do the components of a unitary complex have a tendency to organize themselves? Wheeler believes that they are by nature "social". They have an irresistible tendency to cohere and organize themselves into more and more complex and emergent wholes, so that association may be regarded as the fundamental condition of emergence.

This is an attempt to escape from the difficulties of vitalism by postulating certain fundamental trends in evolution which help to explain its later and higher forms involving a greater complexity of organization. Whatever those fundamental trends may be, it is clear that the evolutionists have moved far away from Darwin and taken up a position which, without directly corroborating the religious view point, certainly makes its look more reasonable.

Among the psychologists who stressed the purposive nature of organic life and indirectly repudiated the Darwinian theory of natural selection as the prime agency of evolution, William McDougall⁹ stands out the most prominent. Although primarily a

⁹ McDougall himself has stressed in his *An Introduction to Social Psychology* the creative role of desire, striving of Love in the terminology of Iqbal. He has written a whole chapter on the Hormic Psychology which explains all animal and human activity from its simplest beginning to its most developed and complex form as being due to a fundamental life-urge, a desire for the attainment of some goal which satisfies the innermost being of the organism. Referring to the development and transformation of bodily organs in the evolutionary process, McDougall says: The hormic theory insists that the differentiation of instinctive tendencies has been, throughout the scale of animal evolution, the primary or leading feature of each step. Bodily organ cannot be supposed to have acquired new forms

psychologist, McDougall really worked out a theory of social evolution by applying evolutionary methods to social psychology. McDougall reasserted the reality of mind which Darwin had banished from the realm of organic evolution. His main importance lies in rehabilitating teleology in the domain of science from where it had been banished by Darwin and his contemporaries. In *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, McDougall explains how the Darwinian theory of evolution was really an extension into the field of biology of principles derived from the mechanical explanations of the physical sciences. Attacking the postulates of mechanical materialism as applied to the physical world, McDougall says:

In the course of the nineteenth century, Atomic Materialism had invaded the young science of biology, permeated and shaped its teachings, and received from it new confidence. Two great fields of biological research yielded results that seemed to harmonize with it and, therefore, to confirm it. Physiology claimed to show that the functioning of all the organs of the human body, specially of the brain, could be explained mechanically, in terms consistent with Atomic Materialism; it seemed thus to render untenable Descartes theory that the human brain was the seat of interaction between the world of matter and the world of Mind, that in and through the brains of living men intelligent purpose could and did effectively intervene in the course of physical events, bending them towards the fulfillment of man's desires. Secondly, Darwin's theory of the origin of species by natural selection led to the general acceptance of the theory of organic evolution and made it seem that all the marvels of nicely adapted structure and function displayed by living things were the products of a purely mechanical process of adaptation continued through many millions of years.

Thus Atomic Materialism engendered a Biological Materialism that harmonized with it and seemed to confirm it. Atomic

and functional capacities that remained functionless until some congruent variation of instinctive tendency brought them into play. Rather, it is necessary to believe that, in the case of every new development of form and function, the first step was the variation of the instinctive nature of the species towards such activities as required for their efficient exercise the peculiarities of form and function in question. Given such variation, we can understand how natural selection may have brought about the development in species of the peculiarities of bodily form and function best suited to subservise such modified or new instinctive tendency. As quoted by Mazher-ud-Din Siddiqi from W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Methuen, London, 150. p. 480.

Materialism was, in origin and substance, a theory of the inorganic world. Biological Materialism was an extension of the same general type of explanation to the sphere of living things, to man himself, his every thought and action. And now that Atomic Materialism has collapsed into ruins, Biological Materialism remains, confident of its own findings and still claiming the support of physical sciences¹⁰.

Criticizing the postulates of Biological Materialism, McDougall says;

If the mechanic assumption is valid, we cannot validly postulate any, even the slightest, degree of freedom of choice, or any effectiveness of our ideals and of our aspirations for their fulfillment; we cannot believe in the reality of moral effort or of creative activity of any kind; our belief that we can by our efforts contribute in some degree to the realization of our ideals; our belief that by taking thought we may refine our ideals, or give preference to the better over the less good; our belief that by self-discipline and culture we may raise ourselves in some degree in the scale of personal value and contribute however little towards the conservation of values—all such beliefs are illusory.

The mechanic assumption is incompatible with all those religious beliefs which to the plain man are of the very essence of religion, those beliefs the destruction of which would leave religion (if it at all survived) merely a system of pale abstract propositions, propositions incapable of evoking enthusiasm, devotion, loyalty or reverence, however sincerely he might believe them.¹¹

Dissatisfied with Biological Materialism, McDougall has built up a whole system of animal and social psychology on the basis of teleological causation as opposed to mechanistic causation, explaining animal and human actions in terms of inner drives. In his outline of psychology and social psychology, McDougall really presents a teleological view of social evolution, showing how the actions of animals and men are moulded not by external factors, as maintained by Darwin, but the forces inherent in animal nature. Animal and social evolution is, therefore, a process which works itself out from within, not from without. McDougall thus repudiates the basic stand

¹⁰ W. McDougall, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, Methuen, London, 1929, pp. 10-11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-3.

of Darwinism. In elaborating a well-reasoned theory of internal causation, he has done great service to religion and indirectly confirmed its conception of a creative God. For the notion of a transcendent deity which modern physics and Darwinian evolution successfully repudiated, is an incomplete version of religious teaching, especially as set forth by the Holy Qur'an. The Qur'an describes God as the first and the Last, as outer Appearance and inner Reality. Here is a combination of transcendence with immanence which might form the basis of a new science of religion. If external Reality is not opposed to the Reality which guides and moulds organic evolution from within, but is only one aspect of that which manifests itself in the inner working organic development, then the whole quarrel between science and religion is reduced to a battle of words and terminology.

B. Iqbal's Concept of Evolution

Iqbal as the greatest philosopher of Islam in modern times believes in just that conception of the Deity is the one Whom every Muslim has referred to. He does not deny a personal and transcendent God, but he also conceives Him as the inner creative activity. His conception of evolution is a synthesis of the Qur'anic teachings with the latest trends in evolution developed by Bergson, Smuts and McDougall in opposition to the Darwinian concept of evolution as proceeding from external causation. From this view point, Iqbal represents a synthesis of the latest Western thought with the essential core of the Qur'anic teachings. Like any great man, Iqbal had an extraordinary capacity for assimilation. He took his material of thought from sources so diverse as Nietzsche, Hegel, Bergson and McDougall among the modern philosophers, and from Rumi among the medieval Islamic mystics. And it is a tribute to his originality and creative genius that he synthesized them into a new unity which bears the stamp of his unique individuality.

Iqbal believes that multiplicity of phenomena arises from a unity which broke itself in its components. All life-activity is, therefore, an incessant craving and strife to regain this original, primal unity which is the source of being and its energy.¹² Iqbal says that subject and object, cause and effect, are only projections of a single

¹² Asrar-o-Rumuz (Asrar-I-Khudi), pp.13-4.

being which sometimes appears as the one and sometimes as the other in order to attain its end. These diverse aspects of the primal being are as sparks into which the flame divides itself. It is this self-division of the primal unit which has produced the human intellect and confined its sphere of activity to the understanding of the parts. It seemed that Iqbal here refers to analytical reason which has to break up things, objects and concepts into their components, before it is able to grasp their import. But if the import of a thing lies not in its components but in its fullness, completeness and its rounded wholeness, the intellect must be incapable of fully diving beneath the surface of partial phenomena and getting at the full view of reality. In other words, the intellects cannot attain to synthesis. This is in fact Iqbal's view and is supported by what he says about Reason as contrasted with Love. It is Love in Iqbal's opinion which can reach the unity of things. Reason by itself is unable to do this, unless it is charged and inspired with Love.

What is relevant to the evolutionary conception in these lines is the idea, suggested by Iqbal, that the driving force of evolution lies in the co-native tendency of things, that is, in their striving for the resumption of their original unity. It is true that Iqbal does not expressly mention this, but in my view this is implicit in Iqbal's description of life activity as springing from the disintegration of some original unity.

There is a Hegelian note in this conception of the evolutionary process. Hegel stressed that the world is the self-realization of the Absolute Idea, through the conflict of opposites. Iqbal assigns no such leading role to the self-activity of the Idea. At the same time he seems to believe that the world process is the self-realisation of an original unity broken up into its components. Action, not thought, is the keynote of

Iqbal's philosophy. With Hegel the real world is but a pale copy of the progress of the Absolute. Therefore, whatever is real is also rational, because it represents the stage of the self-development of the Absolute. Iqbal, however, repudiates the claim of Idea or Reason to represent the reality of life to be its sole creative force. In this he is opposed to Hegelianism as well as the intellectualism of early Greek philosophy which saw nothing in the universe but the activity of Reason. Iqbal thinks that Reason cannot stand alone. To be really fruitful, it must submit to the guidance and control of Love, which

is more fundamental and more primary of the two.

Iqbal is not opposed to Reason as such but only to that form of it which sets itself up as independent activity of man and becomes disconnected with the flow of life. True reason according to Iqbal, can only arise through activity, through Love and through striving after nobler objects. When not associated with such activity and striving, it becomes dead, empty and devoid of value and creativity. This is why the highest type of intellect is reached in men of action, specially in prophet-like persons with a deep sense of mission and destiny upon them. The idea that life progresses through oppositions, and that man's struggle against nature as well as the social conflicts generated by his own activity is a necessary condition of his perfectibility.

The world of nature and material objects has a value only in the sense that it provides the spiritual self of man with opportunities for self-perfection through the oppositions and obstacles that it creates. In so far as it does this, it has got an instrumental value. Beyond this, it is not possible to affirm its reality or value. In this evaluation of external realities Iqbal differs profoundly from Marx and other philosophers of Communism who are equally well convinced of the necessity of oppositions and contradictions in life. Marx too believes that life evolves through overcoming oppositions and contradictions inherent in nature. As soon as the social process has reached a certain stage of development, says Marx, it creates its own contradictions which have to be faced and reconciled in a higher synthesis. But in the Communist philosophy contradictions and conflicts are regarded as a means for the development and progress of social systems. It is the social process and social organization as a whole that gains in richness, content and variety. There is no mention in it of the individual. The individual in Communist Philosophy does not count at all. He is a cog in the wheel, a passive instrument of deeper social processes. With Iqbal, however, the social process is not so important. The self-development and self-perfection of individual men and women are greater achievements which come through the oppositions, contradictions and conflicts in nature as well as in society. Iqbal seems to reject the mythical entity known as society or the social process, for society is only the name of the relations in which certain individuals stand with one another. Apart from concrete individuals, society is an abstraction, so that the process

of struggle against opposition and contradiction leads not to the enrichment of society or the perfection of the social organization but to the self development and progress of individual men and women.

Evil its self according to Iqbal becomes a creative and evolutionary force, because its existence awakens the yearning for good in the human breast and calls forth the power of human resistance. Life would not be worth living if there were no evil forces to be fought against and overcome. The existence of Satan or the evil principle is a necessary condition for the promotion of virtue and the advancement of life. Iqbal in this regard would not like to live in a world where God alone held undivided authority and which did not allow Satanic forces to exist and operate.¹³ Life and struggle are synonymous with each other and one implies the other. Right to existence does not inhere in nature as such; it is the reward of successful effort.

Purpose of life according to Iqbal holds fundamental position in his concept of evolution. It is the driving force of all progress and dynamic activity. Life is preserved through purpose which is an integrating and harmonizing principle in that it enables man to concentrate his energies on a single object. But for purpose, the powers and energies of life would flow out in different channels and dissipate themselves in mutually incompatible and antagonistic efforts. It is purpose which brings unity in man's life and makes him a coherent whole. The purpose-dominated man represents the highest type of integrated personality. In a man who is not swayed by some dominant passion, or controlling purpose, there is a reign of anarchy. Competing and conflicting desires keep his inner self divided. He is whimsical, unpredictable, pulled by one desire and then by another in different directions, amenable to outside influences and a prey to all kinds of temptations. Purpose hardens us against external influences, strengthens us against temptations and saves us from following incompatible aims. The purpose-dominated man alone is free in the sense that his life, character and conduct are moulded from within, and external conditions cannot turn him away from his life-mission. The reverse is the case with persons who are feeble-purposed. Their lives and characters are

¹³ Payam-i-Mashriq, p. 154.

shaped from without. Lack of a strong purpose makes them soft, pliable and amenable to outside pressures. They cannot put up resistance and struggle against the influences around them. Same is the case with those nations which cannot develop a purpose of their own, strong enough to permeate their life-activity and overcome their internal conflicts and divisions. Such nations are bound to fall in some form or other into political and economic servitude. Having no purpose of their own, they must become the instrument of purpose cherished by others. They have to follow the line of least resistance and submit to any pressure from outside that happens to be strongest for the moment. It is the idea of a national mission, the conception of a national destiny and the possession and pursuit of a conscious, clearly-defined purpose that enable nations to sink their internal differences, reconcile the conflicts of various groups and overcome the opposition and divergence of class interests. Where there is no consciousness of purpose, no idea of a goal to be realized, the nation suffers from lack of internal unity and solidarity, and wastes its powers and energies in mutual conflicts, thus weakening itself against external enemies. Purpose, in other words, is the unifying, binding and dynamic force in all activity, individual as well as national. Its absence means stagnation, disintegration and decay.

Iqbal believes in the efficacy of this internal drives, and his theory of love is little else than a theory of intrinsic teleology operating from within the mind and spirit of man in the shape of instinctive desires. This type causation does not dispense with the idea of God; but God as conceived by the intrinsic teleologists, is a not a supernatural, external creative agency. He is the creative principle of life, the Guide that makes every organism conscious of its goal, implants in it the desire for the attainment of the goal and releases the internal dynamic force that is adequate to carry it along the path of struggle and strife necessary for its successful pursuits. This internal desire which impels men and animals to activity in pursuit of vaguely or clearly defined goals, is variously characterized by Iqbal sometimes as *tamanna* (desire), sometimes as *arzu* (yearning) and what he calls 'ishq or Love is only a more intense form of the same co-native tendency. It is a primal urge to live, create, improve and adorn. Religion, arts, civilization, industry, production and distribution of goods, all such activities are ultimately traceable to this innate tendency of things and living beings for ceaseless activity in pursuit of goals, appropriate to their nature. Iqbal finds the secrete

of life, progress and self-preservation in this striving and yearning of things and brings for unattained but attainable objects.

It is true that in its lower forms desire leads to individual and social conflicts, because the pursuit of power and ambition is productive of jealousy, hatred and many other moral evils. Nevertheless, it is capable of refinement and spiritualization and supplies the driving force of all constructive, useful and spiritual activity as well. Between the selfishness and power lust of ambitious politicians and the burning reforming zeal of the prophets and religious reformers, desire acts as a common denominator. If there were no desires, there would be no activity, good or bad. All higher moral conduct is based ultimately on the promptings of desires; its elimination, therefore, would result not only in the disappearance of evil but also in the annihilation of the good. Modern psychology has shown that moral idealism and spiritual sublimity, which are characteristic of nobler humanity, are rooted in man's primitive, crude instincts and his appetitive faculties. Man's animal nature with its interplay of desires and appetites is the foundation from which the nobler sentiments of humanity arise. The moral progress of mankind consists in the transformation, sublimation and refinement of animal instincts in their crude and primitive state. This is also the attitude of Iqbal with regard to the creative role of desire. What he calls *'Ishq* or Love is nothing but the same crude, appetitive desire in its higher, transfigured state, and this love in Iqbal's philosophy is the driving force of all evolutionary progress, a principle of life and creativity, a source of moral uplift and spiritual advancement in human history.

Love as described by Iqbal is not physical, sexual or biological principle. It is the inward drive of all life to attain to its full maturity and development. It is a primal urge to live, to progress and bring out all the inner wealth and resources of being. Every phenomenon and activity that is not related to this primal urge and does not subserve its purposes, leads to stagnation and decay. That is why Iqbal voices strong condemnation of scientific reason, arts and religion when they carve out for themselves autonomous fields of action or set themselves up as independent forces. According to Iqbal, all specialized activity, whether it is intellectual, artistic or religious, is a differentiation of the primal urge which he calls Love and apart from it has no title to independent, autonomous existence.¹⁴ Iqbal

¹⁴ Darb-i-Kalim, p. 37.

further explains that a philosophy which does not spring from the depth of life is so much empty trash; and thought which is not inspired by love or the will to progress, construct, create and beautify the world is deadening. Similarly a religion without the flame of love of the urge to advance, improve and enrich life is only lifeless ritualism. Disbelief and atheism are as good as Islam, if inflamed by love, while Islam is no better than paganism if it is devoid of Love.

This incidentally explains the fall and decay of Muslims, despite their loud professions of high moral and religious principles. In the eyes of Iqbal, to be a Muslim and hold allegiance to Islam, means really to feel a dynamic urge for the improvement of life and society, to be seized by an insatiable craving to enrich the world morally and materially, to give and create where others are trying to grab and acquire. If a person has this dynamic urge, he is a Muslim, even though he may deny the doctrinal part of Islam. Similarly if a man lacks this dynamic urge and inner drive and remains satisfied with things as they are, he is really an atheist, even with his full acquiescence in Islamic doctrines.

Iqbal then goes on to condemn an art which is inexpressive of this primal urge for social and moral improvement. He gives no weight to that art or literature which is unable to inspire men and nations with sense of their destiny, for, he says, the purpose of art is not to rouse ephemeral emotions and transient feelings which spend themselves like flickering sparks. It should be the aim of art to evoke and bring into play emotions of lasting power and efficacy such as many prove effective in moulding human destiny. Thus Love, in Iqbal's poetry, stands for the principle of dynamic activity, a primal urge to live but to so live as to enrich, increase, improve, and advance life. This principle of activity does not admit of scientific skepticism which retards action by making men uncertain of the ends and means of action, whereas Love demands and requires implicit faith unassailed by doubt and hesitation. According to him, one of the most striking characteristics of the evolutionary process has been increasing measure of control, self-direction and self determination which it seems to confer on social humanity and the growing independence of man from the subjecting influence of external environment. And it is the real meaning of evolution.

C. Conclusion

Allama Muhammad Iqbal finally concludes that It is this increasing independence of external environment that enables man to mould his social, political and economic institutions in such a manner that they become the expression of his developed spirituality. He is not free in the sense of being able to dispense with social institutions or simplify them and turn them to their more primitive and less developed forms. But he is free to stamp them with his moral idealism and make them vehicles and agencies of his spiritual aspirations. The reactionary is one who worships outmoded forms, who thinks that institutions, laws and social structures can be revived in their original shape, without variation in detail and the addition of new factors. But Iqbal did not desire to return to the institutional simplicity of early Islam. He accepted the complexities of the modern world, its increasing division of labor and the differentiation of functions which all progress involves. But he rejected many of the ethical concepts and moral evaluations of modern civilization. He wanted to mould and adapt the modern political and economic institution to a scheme of human values derived from Islamic teachings. If this is revivalism or reaction, then every true Muslim should be proud to call himself a reactionary and revivalist.

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The *Development of Metaphysic in Persia* is the title of his dissertation published in London during 1908. This thesis described the history of the religious thought in Persia since Zoroaster to Mulla Hadi and Sabzawar who lived during 18 century. The religious thought in Persia from the ancient time up to the modern era is like chain having close relationship. The role of Turkie in the II world War, and at the end elaborated that Mulla Hadi and Sabzawar influenced by the **Zoroastrianism**.

The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam. It is the greatest scientific work of Allama Iqbal, published in London, in 1934. The book divided into 7 parts; 1. religious experience and knowledge, 2. Philosophical approval of the religious experience. 3. concept of God and the meaning of prayer. 4. Ego. 5. the spirit of Islamic culture. 6. the principle of dynamism in the Islamic Structure. 7. Critics on Germany philosopher Hegel on his concept of Idealism, that religion is not possibility but the ultimate truth.

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