

Analysis of Indonesia's Foreign Policy in Handling The North Natuna Sea Conflict in 2017-2022

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Abstract

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China claims 90% of the area in the South China Sea, including the North Natuna Sea which is owned by Indonesia. As an area that borders other countries and is involved in an ownership dispute with China, violations of sovereignty are prone to occur in this area. In 2016, Chinese fishing boats often committed illegal fishing in the North Natuna Sea. At the peak, KRI Imam Bonjol shot the Han Than Chou ship that was caught spreading nets in Natuna waters. This invited protests from China which were responded to by President Joko Widodo's visit to Natuna and held a meeting to discuss the acceleration of Natuna's development on KRI Imam Bonjol with the ranks of ministers and the TNI Commander and Chief of Police. This research uses qualitative method, to process data from books, journals, articles, scientific papers, and newspapers. From this research, it is found that at least 3 foreign policy measures were adopted by Indonesia to maintain state sovereignty. This step consists of changing the name of the South China Sea region to the North Natuna Sea in a map published in 2017. Then, to strengthen state sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea, the Government mobilized hundreds of North Coast fishermen to go to sea in the Natuna Sea. To enhance the two policies taken, President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 concerning zoning plans for inter-regional areas in the North Natuna Sea. The emergence of this Perpres is expected to accelerate development programs to strengthen the country's resilience, grow the economy, and preserve nature in Natuna.

I. INTRODUCTION

Conflicts between countries can arise from a various issues stemming from each country's interest. From economic interests and ideology, to hegemony, which can interfere with state sovereignty. Sovereignty is described as a state in which a state can act as it wishes in managing the internal and external affairs of its country without violating the rights of other countries or the principles and rules of international law ¹. In practice, state sovereignty is limited by international treaties ².

Although bound by international treaties and laws, countries leaders must bring their countries according to the goals and ideals of their nations, including Indonesia. The purpose of the Republic of Indonesia, as stated in the 1945 Constitution, is: *"To establish a government of the Republic of Indonesia that protects the entire Indonesian nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia and to advance the general welfare, educate the nation's life, and participate in implementing world order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice based on: The Almighty God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by wisdom in the deliberation of representatives, and by realizing social justice for all Indonesian people"* ³.

Indonesia has a vast border area. This brings opportunities and challenges for state sovereignty. Opportunities for state sovereignty are in the form of the availability of large areas of land for the utilization of natural resources that can increase the bargaining value of the country in many ways, while the challenges faced are in the form of prone to conflict with other countries in the border area ⁴.

One of Indonesia's conflict-prone areas is the North Natuna Sea. During June-July 2022 Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (IOJI) detected three Vietnamese patrol boats that entered the Indonesian EEZ several times. These patrol boats are suspected of escorting illegal fishing activities by foreign fishing vessels owned by Vietnam ⁵. The South China Sea maritime area, including the North Natuna Sea, fulfils 77% of the consumption needs of marine fish for the population of surrounding countries ⁶.

Chinese vessels also frequently roam the North Natuna Sea, ranging from Coast Guard ships to warships. Even on September 8, 2022, China Coast Guard intimidated

¹ Enny Narwati, *Kedaulatan Negara Menurut Hukum Internasional*, 2021.

² Budiardjo Miriam, *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2018).

³ Miriam.

⁴ Saiman, 'Kepentingan Nasional, Pemerintah Pusat; Pembangunan Infrastruktur; Perbatasan.', *Sospol*, 2.2 (2017), 142.

⁵ Ade Irma Junida, 'IOJI Deteksi 42 Kapal Ikan Asing Vietnam Di Laut Natuna', *Antara Kepri*, 2022.

⁶ Peggy Puspa Haffsari and Yandry Kurniawan, 'Peran Kepemimpinan Indonesia Dalam Pengelolaan Sengketa Laut Cina Selatan', *Jurnal Sosial Politik*, 4.1 (2018), 55 <<https://doi.org/10.22219/sospol.v4i1.5327>>.

one of Natuna's local fishermen by surrounding Dedi's ship ⁷. This situation makes Indonesian fishermen afraid to go to sea.

The sea territory dispute between Indonesia and China began in 2010 when China claimed part of Indonesia's territory in North Natuna ⁸. In this dispute, the Indonesian government took steps to maintain state sovereignty. In 2016 KRI Imam Bonjol shot the Han Than Chou ship which was caught spreading nets in Natuna waters. This incident invited protests from the Chinese Government ⁹.

President Joko Widodo responded to China's protest by holding a meeting on board KRI Imam Bonjol with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of KKP, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Commander of the Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI), and Chief of Police. This meeting built the accelerated development in Natuna ¹⁰. The Indonesian Government issued various policies during President Joko Widodo's leadership in the territorial dispute in North Natuna. Most recently, President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 concerning the zoning plan between the Natuna Sea - North Natuna.

As the second largest ocean in the world, the South China Sea is one of the strategic shipping lanes and one of the maritime routes in the world. The natural wealth and political benefits obtained from the South China Sea is what strengthen China's ambition to own strategic areas such as the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and even North Natuna ¹¹. The North Natuna Sea around South China Sea is famous as Indonesia's oil and gas producer. Based on the study report of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), Natuna has oil reserves reaching 308.30 million barrels, natural gas of 54.78 trillion cubic feet, and marine fishery resources reaching 1 million tons per year with a total utilization of 36% ¹².

⁷ Yogi Eka Sahputra, 'Diintimidasi Kapal Penjaga Pantai China, Nelayan Natuna Teriak NKRI Harga Mati', *Mongabay*, 2022.

⁸ Yuli Ari Sulistyani, Andhini Citra Pertiwi, and Marina Ika Sari, 'Indonesia's Responses amidst the Dynamic of the South China Sea Dispute under Jokowi's Administration [Respons Indonesia Di Tengah Dinamika Sengketa Laut China Selatan Di Bawah Pemerintahan Jokowi]', *Jurnal Politika Dinamika Masalah Politik Dalam Negeri Dan Hubungan Internasional*, 12.1 (2021), 85–103 <<https://doi.org/10.22212/jp.v12i1.2149>>.

⁹ Muhammad Irfan, 'Ini Kronologi Penangkapan Kapal Han Tan Cou', *PikiranRakyatcom*, 2016.

¹⁰ Anggi Kusumadewi, 'Rapat Di Atas Kapal Perang Di Natuna, Jokowi "Gertak" China', *CNN Indonesia*, 2016.

¹¹ Nadiah Oryza Shabrina, 'Perubahan Respon Indonesia Terhadap Klaimnine-Dash Linetiongkok Yang Melewati Perairan Natuna', *Jurnal Analisis Hubungan Internasional*, 6.2 (2017), 133–46.

¹² Dedi Arman, 'Arti Penting Natuna Sebagai Jalur Lalu Lintas Perekonomian Di Laut Natuna Utara', *INDONESIANA PLATFORM KEBUDAYAAN*, 2018.

Based on the above analysis, researchers want to analyze the Indonesian Government's policy to maintain state sovereignty in the dispute in the North Natuna Sea.

II. METHODOLOGY

Using a qualitative approach, this research collects related variables to explain the government's efforts to maintain state sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea dispute. In this study, the data taken refers to government policies that have been taken, books, newspapers, and other relevant sources. The data is then analyzed using the concept of foreign policy and the concept of sovereignty.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Policies that regulate an entity's relationship with the international world are part of foreign policy. Indonesia, as a sovereign state, carries out a foreign policy that develops according to domestic needs and changes in the national situation. The 1945 Constitution is the basis implementing Indonesia's foreign policy, while Pancasila is positioned as the ideal foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy. Each period of government establishes an operational basis for the foreign policy that is constantly changing following national interests, which is wrapped in the operational basis of Indonesia's foreign under with the principle of free-act¹³.

The free-active foreign policy contains two fundamental elements; 'free' and 'active'. According to Hatta, in the context of the two-bloc competition, 'free' politics means that Indonesia is not in the two blocs and has its way of overcoming international problems. Meanwhile, the term 'active' meant an effort to work harder to maintain peace and ease tensions between the two blocs¹⁴.

Article 1, paragraph 2 of Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations explains that Indonesian Foreign Policy is: "Policies, attitudes, and steps taken by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conducting relations with other countries, international organizations, and other subjects of international law in the context of dealing with international problems to achieve national goals"¹⁵.

¹³ Athiqah Nur Alami, 'Landasan Dan Prinsip Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia', in *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Di Tengah Pusaran Politik Domestik*, ed. by Ganewati Wuryandari, 3rd edn (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2018), pp. 26–52.

¹⁴ Alami.

¹⁵ Indrawati Agung Yudhistira Nugroho, 'Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges', *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges*, 2009, 2014, 1–148 <<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203555590>>.

Defending people's independence and maintaining the country's security are the basic objectives of foreign policy. Security-related border issues are common between neighboring countries. Generally, this occurs in the form of territorial ownership disputes. This is also the case in maritime borders, where the sea becomes a fence that marks the territory of national sovereignty. The ultimate goal of interests in border areas is not about agreement on borderlines. The battle over interests in the border region is endless. This means that the struggle to protect the maritime border is in line with maintaining the establishment of a state ¹⁶.

Indonesia's Maritime Policy

In the struggle to protect the sea area, Indonesia through Prime Minister Juanda on December 13, 1957 issued a declaration called the Juanda Declaration, stating:

- a. That the geographical form of Indonesia as an archipelago has its own characteristics and patterns.
- b. That historically, the Indonesian archipelago has always been a unit.
- c. The territorial sea boundaries set out in the Territorial Zee en Maritieme Kringen Ordonantie 1939 break up the territorial integrity of Indonesia, because they divide the Indonesian land area into separate parts with their own territories.

To strengthen its legal position, the Juanda Declaration was emphasized by Government Regulation in place of (PERPU) No. 4 of 1960 which was followed by implementing regulations regarding the peaceful traffic of foreign sea vehicles in the form of Government Regulation (PP) No.8 of 1962. With the enactment of PERPU No.4 of 1960, which states that the territorial sea is 12 miles wide measured from a straight baseline and that all islands and the sea located between them must be considered as a unified whole ¹⁷.

In addition, the Declaration also states that the determination of territorial boundaries, which are 12 miles wide, is measured by lines connecting the outermost end points of the Indonesian islands ¹⁸. The contents of the Djuanda Declaration were later incorporated into UNCLOS I in 1958. However, this conference needed to determine the

¹⁶ Awani Irewati, 'Perbatasan Laut Indonesia Sebagai Perjuangan Dalam Politik Luar Negeri', in *Potret Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Di Era Reformasi*, ed. by Awani Irewati and Indriana Kartini, I (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2019), pp. 155–87.

¹⁷ Thomas Sunaryo, 'Indonesia Sebagai Negara Kepulauan', *Jurnal Kajian Stratejik Ketahanan Nasional*, 2.2 (2019), 97–105.

¹⁸ Tsauro Muhammad Ahalla, 'Arti Deklarasi Djuanda Dan Konferensi Hukum Laut PBB Bagi Indonesia', *Gema Keadilan*, 2016.

width of the territorial sea and the conception of the archipelagic state proposed by Indonesia. Then UNCLOS II also unable to determine the width of the territorial sea and the archipelagic state. Finally, at UNCLOS III, which took place from 1973 to 1982, the decision was made that Indonesia was an archipelagic state, in addition to stating that coastal states such as Indonesia were entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, an additional zone of 24 nautical miles, a 200-mile zee, and a continental shelf of 350 miles or more, the width of each zone is measured from a reference called the baseline ¹⁹.

The success of diplomacy is when it achieves national interests. In the national security paradigm, diplomacy is one of the strategies that can determine national policy ²⁰. Indonesia successfully asserted its position as an archipelagic state in the international order through the legal umbrella of UNCLOS 1982. Although in UNCLOS 1982, it has been agreed that Indonesia is an archipelagic state, and is entitled to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, an additional zone of 24 nautical miles, 200-mile zee, and a continental shelf of 350 miles or more, China remains in its belief that it has sovereignty over the North Natuna sea, through the nine dash-line ²¹. Interestingly, overlapping territorial claims in the North Natuna Sea do not only occur between Indonesia and China but also between Indonesia and Vietnam. Indonesia's response to the conflict in the North Natuna Sea can be seen through the policies that the Indonesian government has made through the framework of Indonesia's foreign policy. Under the leadership of Joko Widodo, Indonesia embraces the doctrine of the World Maritime Axis.

The World Maritime Axis emerged as a manifestation of the Djuanda Declaration. The World Maritime Axis is Indonesia's vision to become a maritime country that is sovereign, advanced, independent, strong, and able to make a positive contribution to regional and world security and peace following national interests ²². The idea of the World Maritime Axis is a big call to restore Indonesia's identity by returning to the national identity as an archipelagic state, which is expected to realize Indonesia as a maritime power that is united (unity), prosperous (prosperity), and dignified (dignity) ²³. Thus, a free-active foreign policy enshrined in the national interest and participation in

¹⁹ Ahalla.

²⁰ Juanita; Merisa Dwi, Supartono; and Purwanto, 'Peran Diplomasi Maritim Dalam Menangani Krisis Di Laut Natuna Utara Antara Indonesia – China', *Jurnal Keamanan Maritim*, 7.1 (2021), 68–93.

²¹ Ahalla.

²² Presiden Republik Indonesia, 'PERATURAN PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA No. 17 Tahun 2017 Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia', I, 1945.

²³ Rizal Sukma, 'Gagasan Poros Maritim', *Kompas.Com*, 2014.

creating a world order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice will be continued within the framework of the maritime strategy ²⁴.

Special policies need to be issued to maintain sea sovereignty, especially sea areas with the potential for conflict. The Government of Indonesia issues at least 3 policies in handling the North Natuna Sea conflict in 2017-2022.

Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the North Natuna Sea Conflict

Foreign policy taken by Indonesia can be analyzed through the adaptive foreign policy model. The foreign policy formulation model is a process model and an explanation of policy makers to produce the policies adopted. The adaptive model was introduced by James N Rosenau, he explained that foreign policy is a state action to respond to situations that occur to maintain the existence of the state ²⁵.

The adaptive approach model proposed by Rosenau explains the responses and actions of states that are adaptive to the demands and changes that occur in the external and internal spheres. So that foreign policy is considered as a mechanism used by the state to be able to adapt to demands and changes in the external and internal spheres. In the adaptive approach model, there are three variables that are analyzed, namely, internal (structural) changes, external changes, and leadership ²⁶.

Changes in internal variables refer to two sources, namely society and government. Changes that occur in society include geography, culture, history, economic development, technology, social structure, and public opinion. Meanwhile, changes in government are political accountability and government structure. Meanwhile, external changes are changes that occur in the scope outside the state that make the state adapt to existing changes. These changes can be influenced by great power structures, alliance patterns, and situational factors (issues or crises). Then in the leadership variable, the change of leadership of a country often changes the attitude and actions of the leader, which leads to differences in foreign policy taken ²⁷. Through the adaptive analysis

²⁴ Luhulima C.P.F, 'Poros Maritim Dunia Dan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia', in *Potret Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Di Era Reformasi*, ed. by Indirana Irewati, Awani & Kartini, 1st edn (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2019), pp. 39–72.

²⁵ G S Arisca, 'Analisis Kebijakan Ratifikasi Paris Agreement Oleh Indonesia Tahun 2016', 2018, 1–116.

²⁶ Aviva Mila Amalia and others, 'Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri Arab Saudi Terhadap Pemerintahan Suriah Tahun 2011-2013 Melalui Adaptive Model', *Jurnal PIR: Power in International Relations*, 5.1 (2021), 46 <<https://doi.org/10.22303/pir.5.1.2020.46-57>>.

²⁷ M Balgis, 'Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat Dalam Memberikan Sanksi Kepada Venezuela Pada Tahun 2017', 2018.

model, there are at least 3 Indonesian policies on disputes in the North Natuna Sea, namely:

A. Change of SCS to become the North Natuna Sea

Through the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs, the Indonesian government released the latest version of the Republic of Indonesia's state map on July 14, 2017. This map comes after the signing of ratified border agreements between Indonesia and several countries, such as Singapore and the Philippines²⁸.

Deputy I for Maritime Sovereignty of the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Arif Havas Oegroseno, stated that the name change on the map was an adjustment to several oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities that had previously used the names North Natuna, South Natuna, and North East Natuna in their project names. This name change is allegedly an equation between the continental shelf and the water column above it²⁹.

There are at least 4 differences between the old map and the new one released in 2017, such as; a). Changing the name of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea, b). Changes in the border line with the Philippines in the Sulawesi Sea, c). The affirmation of national boundaries in the Malacca Strait, and d). Changes in the boundary line with Palau. Previously, the border with Palau was curved, and a straight line was drawn for Palau's island. In the latest map, the line becomes a straight line³⁰.

In response to Indonesia's renaming of the North Natuna Sea, a spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that the renaming of the North Natuna Sea into the North Natuna Sea is not conducive. He believes that the renaming of an area has no significance could be more conducive to promoting the standardization of geographic naming³¹.

The science of naming regions is called toponymy. Toponymy is a scientific subject that studies the science of naming regions regarding their origin, meaning, use, and types. International institutions that have regulations regarding toponymy are the United Nations through the United Nations Conference on Standardization of

²⁸ Nirmala, 'PERTAMBAHAN LUAS LAUT KITA DALAM PETA BARU INDONESIA', *BINUS University Business Law*, 2017.

²⁹ Harmanto Bimo Pratomo, 'Pemerintah Ganti Nama Laut China Selatan Jadi Laut Natuna Utara', *Merdeka.Com*, 2017.

³⁰ Sulung Lahitani, 'Peta Baru Indonesia Dirilis, Ini 4 Perbedaannya Dengan Yang Lama', *Liputan6*, 2017.

³¹ 'Cina Sebut Penamaan Laut Natuna Utara Oleh Indonesia "Tidak Kondusif"', *BBC News Indonesia*, 2017.

Geographical Names (UNCSGN) and the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN), as well as the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) ³².

Through a spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese government rejected Indonesia's toponymy. They consider the change in the name of the area in Indonesia's latest map to have no meaning and power because, internationally, the area is agreed to be called the South China Sea. Although named the South China Sea, China does not fully own this free area. The naming of the South China Sea was taken, used, and agreed upon because it made naming the free sea area south of China easier. At that time some countries in ASEAN were not fully independent, so it would be complicated if they had to name an area that was in the colonial period. This name was agreed upon in the IHO S-23 document, which occurred in 1953 ³³. Thus, the naming of the South China Sea does not indicate China's ownership status but only refers to an internationally agreed naming of the region.

The naming of North Natuna waters is a form of government assertiveness in the Indonesian jurisdiction by explaining the location in the form of (Point/point) without any boundaries (polygon). Determining the North Natuna boundary has been done through several technical studies of ministries and institutions such as Pusidrosal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Communications, BIG and KKP. The delineation of the North Natuna boundary is based on S-23, with coverage not based on territorial or maritime boundaries but on relevant maritime objects or features used for the safety of shipping navigation or navigation hazards. The North Natuna Sea is still in an overlapping area with China and other countries (Vietnam, and Malaysia). Determination of the boundaries of the North Natuna Sea The legal basis used is S-23 IHO and PP 32 of 2019 concerning the Marine Spatial Plan (MSP) ³⁴. In this case, the change of the name of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea has clearly referred to the suitability of the steps and procedures of S-23 IHO, which is strengthened by PP 32 of 2019 concerning the Marine Spatial Plan.

Rama Anom Kurniawan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the International Arbitration Award (PCA Philippines v. People's Republic of China) does

³² Alief Sambogo, 'Penamaan Laut Natuna Utara Oleh Pemerintah Indonesia Dalam Prespektif Hukum Internasional', *Jurist-Diction*, 1.2 (2019), 381 <<https://doi.org/10.20473/jd.v1i2.10787>>.

³³ Sambogo.

³⁴ A. Trismadi Haryono, E. B. Madjid, 'Penetapan Toponimi Laut Natuna Utara Oleh Indonesia Determining North Natuna Sea Toponymy By Indonesia Towards', *Jurnal EKamanan Maritim*, 7.2 (2021), 181–201.

not establish territory but explain whether or not a maritime feature located in the LCS can obtain marine zoning rights under UNCLOS 1982. The Arbitration decision has implications for the naming of the North Natuna Sea. If the naming of the North Natuna Sea is intended for shipping purposes, it must be based on countries agreement in hydrographic (IHO) and shipping (IMO) forums. Its use is intended to help ease shipping in terms of the identification of sea areas. However, if the naming is more for domestic interests, then no international legal basis can be used. This is because the naming of an area is a unilateral claim of a country ³⁵.

Kemenkomar's efforts in conducting North Natuna Sea Toponymy are first with the publication of the 2017 Map of the Republic of Indonesia, second is the inclusion of the name North Natuna Sea in the 2019 Marine Spatial Management PP whose process has been agreed upon by the internal ministry, the next step which is currently in process is entering the Indonesian National Gasetir, the formal action (in front), the informal step behind is how to consolidate between all stakeholders to implement policies that have been made in various sectors, for example, Ministries and Institutions in mentioning events in the region have used the name North Natuna Sea ³⁶.

Indonesia is not the first country to change the name of its territory in the South China Sea. In 2011, the Philippines renamed the waters of the West Philippine Sea two years before filing a lawsuit over the territorial dispute to the international court in The Hague. The court ruled in favor of the Philippines in 2016. But China rejected the decision and called the court a farce ³⁷.

Le Hong Hiep, a researcher at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, is skeptical of the Indonesian government's name change. He believes the name change has no major impact and is nothing too special, not even something that would raise objections among other Asian countries. Meanwhile, Euan Graham, director of international security at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia, said that what Indonesia does has symbolic value. He sees this move as a subtly coordinated exercise following the international arbitration tribunal's ruling that China's claims over the South China Sea have no legal basis. Graham believes that this is an implicit message that Southeast Asia will not give in as easily as China thinks ³⁸.

³⁵ Haryono, E. B. Madjid.

³⁶ Haryono, E. B. Madjid.

³⁷ KumparanNEWS, 'China Protes Pergantian Nama Laut Natuna Utara Di Peta Baru Indonesia', *KumparanNEWS*, 2017.

³⁸ Ralph Jennings, 'RI Ubah Nama Sebagian Laut China Selatan Dengan "Laut Natuna Utara"', *VOA Indonesia*, 2017.

Although the change of name is not the main thing in the status of sovereignty over territorial ownership, the change of the South China Sea map to the North Natuna Sea has received attention from the Chinese Government. The reaction from the Chinese government is allegedly their concern over the loss of territory in the Nine-dash line claim, in this case, the North Natuna Sea. Naming the Indonesia own the area. Moreover, naming the area from the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea can strengthen national identity.

The step taken by the Government of Indonesia is a definitive decision of independent sovereignty in Kenneth Waltz's perspective, where Indonesia determines the change of name of the sea area within its jurisdiction. State sovereignty is limited to the rules of International law agreed upon by the states involved. Interestingly, the international regulations adopted by Indonesia also allow for renaming areas within a country's jurisdiction for domestic purposes, and there is no international legal basis for this.

Although changing the territory's name does not make Indonesia the owner of the territory, at least this change is the right first step. However, to strengthen Indonesia's position in the conflict in the North Natuna Sea, it is appropriate for Indonesia to register the latest map with the IHO. Thus, this goes hand in hand with international recognition of the naming of the new area. This will strengthen Indonesia's claim to the ZEE area as stipulated in UNCLOS 1982.

The name change also has had no direct impact on the lives of the Indonesian people, nor has there been a significant change in the development of the Indonesian economy, especially for people in areas affected by the name change. However, the positive impact of the name change lies in the political benefits that can affect the status and sovereignty of Indonesia's territory in the South China Sea region. However, this positive impact also comes with a negative impact, namely Indonesia's actions to change the name of the region can be considered provocative actions by countries also involved in territorial claims in this region.

In terms of foreign policy analysis, this name change policy is in accordance with the adaptive model. Where this name change is the impact of changes in the external environment, in this case, China's territorial claims and the influence of internal changes, namely Indonesia's efforts to maintain its sovereignty in the territorial dispute in the LCS. Indonesia, which initially positioned itself as a conflict mediator in the LCS, has shifted its focus to the main goal, namely maintaining Indonesia's national interests in the LCS region, precisely in the North Natuna Sea waters.

B. Deployment of Pantura Fisherman to Natuna Sea

Through Presidential Regulation No. 16/2017 on Indonesia's marine policy, the action plan of Indonesia's marine policy, both the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of Indonesia's marine policy are coordinated by the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment. The Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, after coordinating with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, planned a strategy to deploy Pantura fishermen in the Natuna Sea ³⁹. The deployment of these fishermen is one of the efforts to maintain Indonesia's territorial sovereignty, especially in Natuna which is being polemicized due to China's claim over the area ⁴⁰. In the initial stage, 120 Pantura fishermen were deployed ⁴¹. This number has not reached 50% of the target, where the Government plans to mobilize 470 fishermen and fishing boats to the Natuna Sea ⁴².

In addition to maximizing the potential of fisheries in the North Natuna Sea, the presence of these fishermen also confirms Indonesia's sovereignty in the region. Because the 1982 UNCLOS states the right of coastal states to maximize the exclusive economic zone as far as 200 miles. More than that, the existing fishermen can also be used as the closest detection tool to solve the lack of Indonesia's escort fleet and patrol boats compared to China. Existing fishermen can also prevent illegal activities, such as illegal fishing and other crimes in the region.

In line with the adaptive foreign policy model, the deployment of fishermen is Indonesia's response to the anxiety of illegal fishing violations committed by foreign ships. This is supported by Indonesia's internal political changes through the World Maritime Axis (WMA) doctrine adopted by Indonesia during the Joko Widodo administration. This doctrine is Indonesia's vision to restore the identity of an archipelagic state and make Indonesia a maritime country that is sovereign, advanced, independent, and contributes positively to regional and world security and peace in accordance with national interests. If illegal fishing activities occur so easily, it is

³⁹ Mochammad Mustofa Wijaksono, Panji Suwarno, and Supryadi, 'Evaluasi Strategi Kelautan Republik Indonesia Dalam Pengerahan Nelayan Pantura Di Laut Natuna', *Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial*, 8.3 (2021), 219–26.

⁴⁰ Dian Erika Nugraheny, 'Nelayan Pantura Bisa Melaut Di Natuna Mulai Akhir Januari', *Kompas.Com*, 2020.

⁴¹ Muhammad Choirul Anwar, 'RI Kirim Ratusan Nelayan Pantura Ke Natuna Untuk Bela Negara', *CNBC Indonesia*, 2020.

⁴² 'Nelayan Pantura Akan Melaut Ke Natuna, Wacana Transmigrasi Muncul', *Dinas Komunikasi Dan Informatika Kabupaten Humbang Hasundutan*, 2022.

impossible for this doctrine to run according to the plan that has been planned. So the deployment of fishermen is influenced by the WMA doctrine.

Referring to the foreign policy objectives put forward by Padelford and Lincoln, there are 4 things that the country wants to achieve; national security, economic progress, increasing national power, and international prestige. In terms of national security, it is clear that efforts to prevent violations of sovereignty are made in the placement of Pantura fishermen in the North Natuna Sea. The more fishermen that are present, the tighter our sea borders become. This also has implications for economic progress. The fish caught in the North Natuna Sea so far has yet to be maximized, so the presence of Pantura fishermen who are more advanced in terms of fishing gear and ships can maximize existing fishery resources. The domino effect of the two benefits obtained can indirectly increase national strength, which leads to the realization of the nation's authority in the international arena.

Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto stated that there are at least 6 elements of national strength, namely demographic, natural resources, economic, political, military, and psychological strength⁴³. In the context of the deployment of Pantura fishermen to the Natuna Sea, the Government seems to want to mobilize national power at least on the economic side, through the utilization of the economic value of fish catches that improve the welfare of fishermen, as well as the political side whose purpose is to uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in the North Natuna Sea. Meanwhile, the negative impact that can arise from the deployment of Pantura fishermen to the Natuna Sea is the friction between Natuna's native fishermen and Pantura fishermen who go to the sea in Natuna. Moreover, the large number of catches can lead to price competition reducing the fish's selling price.

C. Presidential Regulation on Zoning of Natuna Region

Presidential Regulation (Perpres) is a legal instrument issued by the President of Indonesia to regulate the implementation of government duties and functions and guidelines for government and private institutions in carrying out their activities. In addition, Perpres can also be used to respond to urgent and emergency problems. In dealing with disputes in the North Natuna Sea, President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022. Article 5 of Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 serves to:

⁴³ 'Menhan Prabowo Subianto: Kekuatan Nasional Penting Untuk Hadapi Tantangan Global', *Kemhan RI*, 2022.

- a. harmonizing the spatial structure plan and pattern of sea space in the zoning plan of the inter-regional area with the spatial plan;
 - b. providing direction for provincial spatial plans, KSN spatial plans, and KSNT zoning plans within the North Natuna-Natuna Sea planning area;
 - c. determining the Marine Spatial Pattern in the waters outside the Coastal waters, in the jurisdiction area for the function of Public Utilization Areas and Conservation Areas in the Sea;
 - d. coordination of development implementation in the North Natuna-Natuna Sea;
 - e. realization of integration and harmony of interests across sectors and between provincial regions in the North Natuna-Natuna Sea; and
 - f. controlling the utilization of marine space in the North Natuna-Natuna Sea ⁴⁴
- Article 7 then stipulates that the purpose of the regional zoning plan is to realize:
- a. marine growth centers to drive the regional economy;
 - b. an effective and efficient network of marine infrastructure and facilities;
 - c. sustainable capture fisheries and/or aquaculture zones;
 - d. environmentally friendly mining zones;
 - e. marine tourism destinations that are competitive, globally oriented, and encourage economic growth;
 - f. defense and security zones to support regional security and defense stability;
 - g. Marine Conservation Areas that support the sustainable management of Fish Resources and the environment;
 - h. preservation of marine biota;
 - i. control of marine spatial utilization in the North Natuna-Natuna Sea; and
 - j. strategic areas related to the environment and world heritage sites that are optimally and sustainably developed ⁴⁵.

This Perpres has been criticized for why North Natuna-Natuna was chosen as the zoned area. The Perpres imply that the Natuna zone is a prime and important zone for Indonesia. Then comes the comparison of the Natuna Sea area with the Maluku sea, which is more massive in fish theft ⁴⁶.

The North Natuna Sea, which is in the South China Sea region, is included in China's claim through the nine-dash line map. The United States as the sole ruler of the world, feels disturbed by the development of China's influence and is also present in the

⁴⁴ Tentang Rencana, 'Tahun 2014', 134422, 2022.

⁴⁵ Rencana.

⁴⁶ 'Mewujudkan Zona Pertahanan Dan Keamanan Di Natuna' (Indonesia: Metro TV, 2022).

South China Sea region by sending warships in the context of freedom of navigation and several joint military exercises. In addition to stemming China's influence, America's presence in the region also secure the interests of international trade routes in the South China Sea. The presence of two major powers on Indonesia's shores has raised special attention to the North Natuna Sea region. The form of this attention is the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022, which discusses the Zoning Plan for the Natuna Sea - North Natuna Interregional Area.

This Perpres was initiated as an initial step to secure Indonesia's home page amid the vortex of the struggle for influence between America and China in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Maluku waters have no friction with other countries. However, the Indonesian Navy plans to build a military base in the Maluku region. This indicates that the entire region is important to Indonesia, but the North Natuna Sea is included in the priority scale influenced by the actors playing in it. Basically Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 was issued as a legal basis that guarantees the course of defense and territorial utilization policies, which have been running, are running, and will run. In its implementation, this Perpres strengthens existing development policies and is expected to spur the acceleration of state resilience development and maximize economic potential, and spatial utilization in the Natuna Sea region.

State Defense in Islamic Perspective

The discussion of state defense in the Qur'an is not textually explained explicitly, most verses explain jihad fi sabilillah. Jihad is a dynamic concept and develops in accordance with the context that accompanies it. Thus, jihad is not always an activity to defend the country in a state of war. In a state of peace, the field of jihad can consist of da'wah, education, economics, and others. In short, jihad is all actions that fight for goodness, such as defending or defending the country.

Ibnul Qayyim Al Jauziyyah, in Fitiani Asmin classifies Jihad in 4 levels;

First : Jihadun Nafs

- a. Jihad to learn useful knowledge and righteous deeds, where no happiness in this world and in the hereafter can be achieved without having knowledge.
- b. Jihad by practicing the knowledge that has been learned.
- c. Striving by preaching the knowledge that is owned, and teaching it.
- d. Striving in facing human challenges in the way of da'wah, and always expecting Allah's reward.

Second : Jihadu Syaitan

- a. Rejecting shubhat and doubts that pollute faith.
- b. Striving to reject the desires of the soul in the form of bad desires and desires
Third and Fourth: Struggle against disbelievers and hypocrites
 - a. With the Heart
 - b. With the Tongue
 - c. With Treasure
 - d. With the Soul

To deal with infidels, jihad using power is preferred, while dealing with hypocrites is preferable with the tongue ⁴⁷.

Jihad to defend or defend the country according to Abdul Mustaqim, is realized in maintaining principles or values, among others: Ittihad (unity), al-syura (deliberation), al-'is (justice), al-hurriyyah ma'a mas'uliyah (freedom with responsibility), legal certainty, a guarantee of haq al-'ibad (human rights) and so on ⁴⁸.

In defending the country, the people have an important role in it. This can be seen from the policies that Indonesia has taken in order to maintain state sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea. The policy is to mobilize Pantura fishermen to go to sea in the North Natuna Sea area. Indirectly, the concept of state defense in Islam emphasizes the importance of being active, responsible, and cooperative citizens to build a strong and prosperous nation. The struggle to defend the country based on the principle of al-ittihad is colored by the spirit of togetherness. This spirit arises from the readiness of North Coast fishermen to support policies that have been taken by the Government. By involving North Coast fishermen who are part of Indonesian citizens, it is clear that the spirit of togetherness in order to defend the integrity of the nation has been reflected in the Indonesian nation to reject China's claim to include the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia in the nine-dashline claim.

The spirit of togetherness in order to maintain the sovereignty of the country carried out between the Government and Indonesian citizens represented by fishermen can be seen from the obligation of the community to obey the leader, in this case the Government. This situation can be seen from the Qur'anic verse which commands to obey the leader.

⁴⁷ Fitiani Asmin, 'AKTUALISASI JIHAD DI INDONESIA: PERSPEKTIF AYAT JIHAD SURAH AL TAUBAH', *Al Wafi*, 1 (2022).

⁴⁸ Abdul Mustaqim, 'BELA NEGARA DALAM PERSPEKTIF AL-QUR'AN (Sebuah Transformasi Makna Jihad)', *Analisis*, XI (2011).

Allah says in the Qur'an:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ فَإِن تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي شَيْءٍ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَحْسَنُ تَأْوِيلًا

(٥٩)

Meaning: [1] O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Muhammad), [2] and the ulil amri (holders of power) among you, [3] Then, if you differ on something, [4] then return it to Allah (Al-Quran) and the Messenger (sunnah), [5] if you believe in Allah and the day after, [6] That is more important (for you), [7] and better the result. (QS An-Nisa: 59)

The interpretation of this verse is as follows:

[1] Imam Bukhari narrated from Ibn Abbas radhiyallahu 'anhuma about the verse, "*Athii'ullah wa athii'urrasuaula wa ulil amri minkum* ," he said, "This verse was revealed regarding Abdullah bin Hudzafah bin Qais when the Prophet sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam send him in a sariyyah (small army)." Imam Bukhari also narrated from Ali radhiyallahu 'anhu, he said: The Prophet shallallahu 'alaihi wa sallam sent a sariyyah and appointed an Ansar as his leader and ordered them to obey him. One time the leader was angry and said, "*Didn't the Prophet sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam order you to obey me?*" They replied, "*Yes* ." The leader said, "*Then collect firewood for me* ." They also collect them. The leader said, "*Light the fire* ." So they lit it, then the leader said, "*Enter you into it* ." They almost wanted to do it, but some of them restrained some of the others, and they said, "*(Verily) we fled to the Prophet sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam from the fire (hell)* ." They remained like that until the fire was extinguished so that the anger of the leader disappeared, then the news was conveyed to the Prophet sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam, then he said, "*If they had entered it, they would not have come out until the Day of Judgment. Indeed obedience is only in matters that are ma'ruf (reasonable)*."

[2] By doing what is obligatory and what is circumcision and avoiding the prohibition.

[3] Included in ulil amri are the government, judges and muftis (ulama). That is because human affairs, both religion and the world, will not be good except by submitting and obeying them as a form of obedience to Allah and hoping for a reward from Him. Of course, on condition that they do not order immorality. If you order immorality, then it should not be obeyed. In this verse, obedience to ulil amri is not

mentioned again as obedience to Allah and His messengers. This is because obedience to ulil amri is conditional, namely not ordering immorality.

[4] Both include ushuluddin (religious foundations) and furu' (its branches).

[5] Because in it, there is a solution to the problem of khilafiyah, either by its firmness, generality, hints, attention, understanding of it or its general meaning, in which everything that is still vaguely associated with it.

[6] Therefore, a person who does not return the problem to both of them, is not a true believer, in fact he is the same as believing in the taghut as will be explained in the next verse.

[7] Instead of speaking his opinion ⁴⁹.

This verse of the Qur'an, which discusses obedience to leaders, is reinforced by the hadith of the prophet, namely when Rasulullah SAW said, “ *A Muslim is obliged to listen and obey in matters he likes or hates as long as he is not ordered to act immorally. If ordered to act immorally, then there is no obligation to listen and obey .*” (Narrated by Bukhari no. 7144).

With this, it is increasingly clear that the obligation of citizens to support Government policies, especially in efforts to deal with external forces of the state to maintain state sovereignty. The Government's efforts to involve the community can be seen in the policy of deploying Pantura fishermen in the North Natuna Sea. Referring to the hadith above, fishermen who are involved in this policy are expected to accept decisions on policies that the government has chosen. Because the Government believes that the void in the North Natuna Sea allows for foreign nations to violate state sovereignty.

The policy of changing the name of the region and deploying Pantura fishermen to the Natuna Sea is in line with Islamic rules regarding self-defense. Because this policy was taken in the context of self-defense, in this case state sovereignty to face China's claims in the North Natuna Sea. Unfortunately, in the policy of issuing Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 concerning the zoning plan for the Natuna Sea - North Natuna area, the Government is too focused on the physical development of the region, defense and security, protection of marine biota, and other economic uses, without including human development efforts. Whereas by preparing good human resources, it will be easier to maximize the policies that have been taken.

⁴⁹ Meefta, ‘TAFSIR SURAT AN NISA’ AYAT 56-63’, *Tafsir.Id*, 2015.

IV. CONCLUSION

The North Natuna Sea is included in China's nine-dashline claim. Indonesia's EEZ region is rich in natural resources, both fisheries and oil and gas, and is prone to violations of territorial sovereignty, such as illegal fishing. In an effort to secure the potential natural resources contained therein, as well as to maintain state sovereignty, the Indonesian government issued a new map and renamed the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea. This name change is expected to build the perception of Indonesia's absolute ownership in the EEZ area as regulated in UNCLOS 1982. This was then protested by the Chinese government on the grounds that the Indonesian government's name change was a provocative and baseless effort. Interestingly, Indonesia's renaming policy does not violate any international rulings, as there are no international rules restricting the renaming of territories for domestic purposes.

The policy of changing the name of the region is then reinforced by the deployment of North Coast fishermen to the Natuna Sea. The high presence of fishermen in the Natuna Sea is expected to detect foreign presence to prevent threats, both civilian and foreign military threats. In strengthening the various policies that have been taken, President Joko Widodo then issued Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 concerning the zoning plan between the Natuna-North Natuna Sea areas. This Perpres is expected to become a legal umbrella and accelerate the economic development and defense and security programs that have been determined and will be taken by the government.

The foreign policy scheme carried out by the Government of Indonesia can be harmonized with the concept of state defense in Islamic views. In the case of the North Natuna Sea dispute, the Government involved the community, especially fishermen, in order to maintain the principle of al-ittihad (unity). The unity between the government and the fishing community is clearly seen from the deployment of Pantura fishermen to the Natuna Sea to emphasize Indonesia's sovereignty in the disputed area, as well as the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 41 of 2022 as a legal basis for the certainty of guaranteeing fishermen's activities in the North Natuna Sea. Then the defense of this country is strengthened by the attitude of obeying and obeying the orders of leaders who fight external entities that have the potential to disrupt state sovereignty.

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