

“Causal Factors for Conducting Peaceful Settlement between GRP and MILF on Ancestral Domain Aspect 2008”

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Abstrak

Tulisan ini mencoba menganalisa dinamika proses negosiasi antara Pemerintah Filipina dan Front Pembebasan Islam Moro pada tahun 2001 sampai 2008. Secara khusus tulisan ini membahas tentang proses negosiasi pada aspek ancestral sebagai salah satu dari tiga aspek terakhir dalam Perjanjian Damai Tripoli tahun 2001 dengan menggunakan studi literatur. Berdasarkan teori kematangan (Zartman dan Faure, 2005), kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk melakukan perjanjian damai pada tahun 2008 karena keduanya menyadari berada dalam dua situasi; (1) Mutually Hurting Stalemate; dan (2) Mutually Enticing Opportunity. Kedua belah pihak sama-sama merasakan dampak buruk akibat konflik militer dan menyadari bahwa dengan melakukan negosiasi mereka akan mendapatkan keuntungan di masa depan. Mereka mencoba menghindari situasi catastrophe dan mencoba meraih beberapa keuntungan politik, sosial dan ekonomi dari dukungan pihak lokal dan internasional.

Kata kunci: Resolusi Konflik, Konflik Mindanao, MoA-AD, MILF, Negosiasi, Teori Kematangan

Abstract

This article tries to analyze the dynamic of negotiation processes between Government of Republic of Philippines (GRP) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) since 2001 until 2008. It will concern in the negotiation process toward the ancestral domain aspect as the last three major aspects of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace 2001 using literature studies. According to the ripeness theory (Zartman and Faure, 2005), GRP and MILF has been conducting negotiation for 2008 because both conflicting parties have realized the two situations of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate and Mutually Enticing Opportunity. Both conflicting parties has shared the bad experience toward military fighting of Mindanao conflict and realize that by conducting a negotiation they can has expectation on the certain goals for the future. They try to avoid catastrophe situation and gain several benefit from local and international support in the term of politics, social and economic sphere.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Mindanao Conflict, MoA-AD, Moro, MILF, Negotiation, Ripeness Theory.

Introduction

Mindanao conflict has happened in many years ago. It is not a simple form of rebellion movement toward official Philippines government. Mindanao conflict has covered about self-identity and the

independence of a nation from Moslem Mindanao. Before the arrivals of Spain colonize, Mindanao Island was governed by Sultan. They practiced Islamic value for governing their politics and social-economic life. The expansion of Spain

colonize around 1521 has stimulated the erupted of conflict. The Moslem Mindanao fought against colonizer who tries to subjugate Mindanao Island become Roman Catholicism as well as Luzon and Visayas Island of Philippines. The failure of Spain colonizer did not end the conflict of Mindanao Conflict. In 1898, under the Treaty of Paris, USA came as new colonize and successful in integrating Mindanao as part of Philippines territorial integration. Although American colonies used the different approach by using political manipulation toward Moslem Mindanao, they still in an effort to change the mainstream of that population into Filipino's mainstream. The creation new law of the land and the migration of Christian population from North into South have made the marginalization of Moslem Mindanao and the indigenous population of Mindanao Island. The continuation of that policy by Philippines government after the independent has led the emerging of the resistance movements from Moslem Mindanao.

According to Matuan (2004), there are several issues that constitute the Mindanao problem, namely;

- 1) Poverty, inequality, and environmental destruction;
- 2) Political corruption;
- 3) Negative image held by

- Christians, Moro, and Lumad peoples of each other;
- 4) Failure of the national government to integrate Moro peoples into national Filipino identity;
- 5) The economic exploitation of Mindanao's resources and the migration of Filipino form the north that led to loss of ancestral lands;
- 6) The Moro struggle for self-rule

Another opinion has been delivered by Quevedo (2004), in his recent article; he mentioned four main roots of conflict integrated into Philippine government as follows;

- 1) Poverty, integrated with low productivity, criminality, marginalization, and environmental degradation;
- 2) Ignorance, it was caused by poor school and education;
- 3) Disease, including malnutrition and poor access to health services;
- 4) Injustice, human right violation, land conflict, graft, and corruption.

These issues have significant factors that have caused the emerging effort from Mindanao people, especially for Bangsamoro to get their independence form, Philippine. Poverty, inequality and environment destruction which are done by the regime or government make Bangsamoro people take the action in strengthening position its to rebel the

government. Social injustice, economic exploitation, unequal developments have contributed to the factor of emerging the conflict between government and Moros people. These factors have contributed to the complexity of Moro problems, from the primordial conflict it has been shaped by instrumental conflict and finally, the Mindanao conflict has reached a stage of the constructivist conflict.

The standard bearer of Moro front has been initiated by the emerging of Moro National Liberation Movement (MNLF) under Nur Misuari command in 1969. In progress, GRP and MNLF conducted negotiation stage and brought agreement namely the Final Peace Agreement in 1996. It assumed as the final agreement for solving the Mindanao conflict. Nevertheless, the FPA in 1996 has failed to end the conflict. It becomes a momentum for the emerging new resistance movement among Moslem Mindanao.

The new standard bearer of Moro front has been replaced by the establishment of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1976. It uses Islamic ideology as its basic ideology of the movement. MILF has objectives to formulate the Islamic independent state of Moslem Mindanao. At the beginning, MILF has organized guerilla warfare strategy for dealing with

Philippines government. It has responsible for several bombing attack and military action against Philippines government. The strategic has shaped into semi-conventional warfare. MILF has established the shadow government on Mindanao Island. It becomes a form of political-military organization by establishing its Political Committee Sets-ups from the central until Barangay level. It has aimed to replace the existing of Philippines government officers in Mindanao Island. In progress, initiated by Ramos government and Estrada's governance afterward, during 1997 until 2000 both parties had conducted the negotiation without third parties invitation. During that years, GRP and MILF have concerned on the issue of the ceasefire agreement and dismissed the hostilities among them. In 2001, under the President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration, GRP and MILF has been conducting negotiation by inviting Malaysia as the third parties facilitator. It becomes a momentum for MILF to be a legal representative and new standard bearer of the Moro front. Soliman has categorized the processes of peace talk between GRP and MILF into two terms namely "domestic stage" in 1997-2000 and "diplomatic stage" in 2001- present. The ongoing processes of peace talk between

GRP and MILF cannot deny from the erupted of arm conflict and hostilities between them. After the heavy aggregation from GRP to Moslem village in Buliok in 2003 with the aim to capture the MILF headquarter in Buliok complex. Both conflicting parties have decided to continue the peace talk on the issue of the ancestral domain for 2008. It becomes a big question, why GRP and MILF still continue the peace talk although many agreements have failed to solve Mindanao conflict.

According to the ripeness theory (Zartman and Faure, 2005), both conflicting parties will conduct negotiation because they are in certain conditions and states that negotiation will be achieved if the conflict has reached on the high stage of tension but before reaching capitulate condition. Capitulate means there is an unequal level of actors. It will be difficult even impossible to conduct any negotiation among conflicting parties. He makes simple explanation by categorizing the condition into two terms of a condition which becomes the concept to explain why conflicting parties finally use negotiation for solving their conflict. Zartman and Faure (2005 p. 272) describe:

...a ripe moment is depicted as a "mutually hurting stalemate" (MHS),

which is characterized by a deadlock. The parties are locked into a situation because of an impending catastrophe. In this situation, the disputing parties come recognize, through a cost-benefit calculation, the sharp increase in the costs of further escalation, which limits the use of unilateral strategies and enhances the prospect of a negotiated settlement as the only way out of an escalating situation.

“Another way to conceptualize a ripe moment is as “mutually enticing opportunity” (MEO), which is distinguish from an MHS by its emphasis on future gains rather than on costs. During a ripe moment, the parties begin to negotiate because they expect to achieve certain goals using alternative strategies instead of conflict”.

Based on those concepts, worse situation toward conflict settlement by using military approach leads both parties to conduct peaceful settlement in resolving Moro’s conflict. Both parties have shared the common sense of disadvantages from arms conflict. The major wars on 2000 and 2003 did not give benefit for both conflicting parties. Degradation of economic development regarding government’s arms policy or military attack against MILF become one of the considerations which must be thought

deeply by GRP. It also supported by infrastructures destruction, unbeneficial impact on physical and psychological that have pushed both parties for conducting the negotiation as a possible way to settle their dispute. The continuation of military force with GRP will harm the MILF's image and credibility as a liberation movement for representing the Bangsamoro's demand to the national and international world. GRP and MILF also rethink about beneficial impacts they can get if they want to conduct negotiation for settling the conflicts even from domestic and international society such as OIC, Malaysia, the World Bank, the United State of America, Japan, and other international actors.

The Dynamic of Mindanao Peace Processes in 2001-2008

On March 24, 2001, both parties signed the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talk between GRP and MILF in Kuala Lumpur. It was regarded as Framework Agreement and as the open time of diplomatic stage for GRP and MILF to settle Mindanao conflict. This was the first agreement signed since President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo turned in her power on January 20, 2001. It has been followed by several agreements in GRP-MILF peace processes. The great

agreement around that year was the signing of Tripoli Agreement on Peace between GRP and MILF on June 22, 2001, in Tripoli pointing out three clusters to be negotiated for next step: security aspect, relief, and rehabilitation (refer to humanitarian aid and development aspect), and ancestral domain. It was guided by several agreements for implementing the three points from Tripoli Agreement in 2001. In August 2001 at Putrajaya, Malaysia both conflicting parties has signed an agreement on the first aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace about security aspect that covered about the cessation of hostilities and security guarantees. It was followed by the signing of an agreement about the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspect as the second aspect of the TPA of 2001 between GRP and MILF in May 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. However, again, those agreements cannot decline the tension between GRP and MILF; Arroyo had ordered the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to attack MILF in Buliok complex in North Cotabato and Maguindanao on February 11, 2003. This command made the conflict erupted again with three weeks fighting.

On March 2003, both parties continued the negotiation process and held

several meetings discussing peaceful settlement between GRP and MILF and the last three points of Tripoli Peace Agreement (TPA) in 2001 become the most attractive issue for both parties. In 2004, both conflicting parties initiated the formation of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) with Malaysia as the leader. Finally, both conflicting parties have agreed on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) after the long road of mapping draft the last three major point of the TPA since the last 2003 until 2008. It was scheduled on August 5, 2008, and predicted become a key for solving Moro problems and settle the Southern Philippines conflict. It covers three main issues: Ancestral Domain, peace, and natural resource right within the newly designated Moro territory (Wilson, 2009).

The processes of peace talk between GRP and MILF about ancestral domain has been influenced by the existing of hawkish groups from outside and inside both parties. They tend to continue using military action to deal the Mindanao conflict and do not support the promoting peaceful settlement. The potential spoilers within the peace talk come from local and national officers of Philippines government. The Philippines constitution

never supports the demand from MILF as well as Bangsamoro people. It has been claimed to threaten the national security and integration. Arm Force of Philippines based on that constitution has used military offensive to battle with MILF. The oligarch from Mindanao and Manila has been informed as the potential spoilers within peace processes for 2008. The local officer of one province from Mindanao Island strongly refused the processes of peace talk on the issue of ancestral domain aspect is North Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Pinol. According to ICG report, he has been supported by several Governors they are Zamboanga City Mayor Celso Lobregat and former mayor of Carmen, North Cotabato Roger Tolino.

“...The Supreme Court, Congress, and local government executives are not on board the peace process. Worse, Arroyo is still the indecisive president.” (Luwaran.com, 2009)

The potential spoilers also exist in MILF's body. ICG has reported that there were any “renegade” who prefer to war rather than peace talk. The splinter Commander of MILF has been reported responsible for bombing action during the ARMM governor election. From outside both conflicting parties, the hawkish group has been represented by the existing of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Lumad

population. Renegade from MILF has been suspected open relationship with ASG for conducting terrorism action. The Ancestral domain is the great issue for the Lumad tribes who are the indigenous people of Mindanao Island. They tend to become a potential spoiler when the agreement just for Moslem population and assumed as threatened for Lumad itself.

Beside that, the dove groups also exist within GRP and MILF peace talk processes. They support on the promoting peaceful settlement for Mindanao conflict. It does not just come from local but also from the international community. They have strong commitment to supporting the peaceful settlement in Mindanao. Several Islamic states such Malaysia, Libya, Indonesia etc have offered its contribution for creating reconciliation toward Mindanao conflict. The financial aid and development project also comes from America, Japan, World Bank, ADB and other international community.

The Causal Factors of Negotiation Stage for Settle Mindanao Conflict of 2008

GRP and MILF have been conducting several negotiations and signing several agreements since 1997 until 2008. The great stage of the negotiation process between GRP and MILF are under Arroyo

administration because in her era of governmental administration MILF has known as the legal representative of Bangsamoro demand which replace the existing of MNLF after the signed of FPA in 1996 as the Moro front. Although MILF has done several peace talk with previous Philippines President since 1997 as mentioned by Soliman under the Arroyo administration MILF has a big chance and become the one of Moro front who has the opportunity to negotiate with the government. The momentum of peace talk between GRP and MILF under Arroyo administration is in 2001, 2003 and the recent peace talk in 2008. This fact becomes interesting topic to analyze why GRP and MILF still stand on the root of peace talk and resuming the negotiation for 2008 although they have failed experience for settling Mindanao conflict through negotiation in 2001 and 2003. All know that the big influence from the hawkish groups also shaped the dynamic of the conflict. It becomes a question what is the consideration from both conflicting parties so that they still consistence for resuming peace talk toward Mindanao conflict settlement although the spoilers or hawkish groups around them and may threat their peace effort.

The causal factors that influence the policy from both conflicting parties to settle the Mindanao conflict can be analyzed in term of two aspects of impulse; inside and outside the conflicting parties. The encouragement from inside and outside had pursued GRP and MILF to any reconciliation toward their dispute. The government saw the big chance to conduct the negotiation with the new leader of MILF, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim who most secular than Salamt Hashim, hopefully, the negotiation between GRP and MILF could reach the final agreement for settle Mindanao conflict peacefully. GRP and MILF have begun for resuming the peace process after the Great War between them in 2003 by inviting third parties role through the creation International Monitoring Team (IMT). The IMT composed of Malaysia as the leader, Libya, Japan and Brunei as members. The Mohagher Iqbal statement that negotiation as the best solution for settle the Mindanao conflict become the great chance to resuming the peace talk between GRP and MILF.

In August 2005, Mohagher Iqbal, MILF chief peace negotiator, reminded the Bangsamoro that the best way to solve the conflict in the region was through a negotiated political settlement. He argued

that “resolving the problem through negotiation is bloodless and everybody is a winner.” (Taya, 2007)

Iqbal’s statement has supported by the statement from MILF’s Vice Chairman, Ghadzali Jaafar, toward the peaceful settlement through negotiation between GRP and MILF, as reported (Cardona, 2006):

“The MILF, on the other hand, seeks to have peace in Mindanao after 30 years of struggle”

GRP’s commitment to continue the peace talk process with MILF has clearly stated by Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as reported:

“I welcome and support all peaceful, democratic and people-based consultations for peace and development. The nation gathers its strength from the diversity of ideas and aspirations channeled into effective democratic processes; and won on the negotiation table and not in the battlefield,” (Koppin, 2005)

Arroyo also delivered her statement toward the commitment to resume the peace talk with MILF for settling Mindanao conflict after her meeting with officials of the Cabinet Cluster on National Security on March 12, 2007, as follow (Vitug, 2007):

“I have decided to step up all measures to enforce the law, preserve the atmosphere of peace and stability, and advance the ongoing peace talks between the GRP (Government of Republic of Philippines) and the MILF.”

The conflicting parties have a strong commitment to implementing the ceasefire agreement and dismissed their military battle after the armed force conflict between AFP and MILF in 2003. It was realized that the clash between GRP and MILF after the military fighting in 2003 has decreased although several minor battles still happen between GRP and MILF.

A. Mutually Hurting Stalemate

The experiences toward war effect from conflict bring both conflicting parties in the stuck condition or deadlock situation to continue the massive military fighting for solving the conflict. The conflicting parties think that they will not gain the benefits even become the winner in that conflict if they still continue the confrontative action. They need another solution which is saving them from dead loss and a shellacking by conducting peaceful settlement through negotiation. According to the Ripeness theory, this situation categorizes as Mutually Hurting Stalemate. In this case, GRP and MILF share the experience toward the effect of

conflict and find out that they need the different approach to settling their dispute.

They believe that continuing the conflict by using military approach will decline each position and escalate the conflict in Southern Philippines more over both conflicting parties get pressure from international community and a global world for seeking the reconciliation toward Mindanao conflict. They find themselves no other way or approach to settling their dispute except that they could use peaceful settlement through negotiation for settling the Mindanao conflict.

In the side of government and Philippines state, in general, the continuing conflict settlement by using military force will decline its political and economic stability also disturb the national security and national development program. More than 30 years Southern Philippines conflict has emerged and brought damage both in physical and physiological effect. Many houses are fired, public's devices have broken, many civil people become displacements, and refugees even died. They lost their houses, families, children, wealth and opportunities life in welfare. On August 27, 2007, Arroyo has invited the MILF to conduct a peace talk regarding to the Basilan situation. The continuation of military fighting against the Moro front

in Mindanao could harm the national development of the Philippines itself. Many populations of Mindanao become refugees and displacement since the conflict between GRP and the Moro front has erupted. Long-standing of conflict could decline the national income and economic growth of Philippines. Philippines government is facing the poverty incident which is threatening state stability during the conflict.

In battles between the MILF and the AFP, 30,000 internally displaced people (IDP) were recorded in 1997; 1,014,645 in 2000; 24,000 in 2001; and 75,419 in 2003. The huge physical, social and economic costs of the war have in fact deepened the animosity and distrust among the contending parties as well as divisions among peoples along religious lines (Philippe Information Agency 2008).

A Huge amount of military budget become great effect to the economic development of Philippines state. The resolving conflict through military force did not settle the conflict correctly otherwise, it brought the conflict difficult to settle and the core of problem never be touched. the effect of conflict has not only threatened the security matter but also threatened the national economic

development of Philippines state as followed.

The cost of the war for the inhabitants of the region is staggering. Consider this: in 1971 alone, 1,000 people died. From 1972 to 1976, 100, 00 to 120,000 people were killed, 50% from the MNLF, 30% from the AFP and 20% of the civilian population. It is estimated that the cost of the war in the 70's ran up to 73 billion pesos. The 2005 UN Philippine Human Development Report states that, since 1975, the conflict in Mindanao has cost between PHP5-10 billion yearly (Philippe Information Agency 2008).


...after the year 2000 war, the national budget of the Philippines rose from 725 billion pesos in 2001 to 780.79 billion pesos in 2002, and 804.2 billion pesos in 2003. Yet Mindanao's share of this national budget declined from 13.9 per cent of the national budget in 2001 to 11.9 percent in 2002. In 2003, Mindanao's share was only 10.55% of the national budget (Russell etc, 2004).

Philippines government also rethinks about its relation with international world toward the Mindanao conflict. There were possibilities that the Philippines could loss the investors or foreign investment who will invest in Philippines and Mindanao

especially if the Mindanao conflict still continues by confronting military offensive

to settle the conflict.

High Regional Diversity in the Extent of Poverty (Adriano, 2008)



MILF has stood in a dead loss position after the “all-out war policy” launched by Estrada administration in 2001 and the “Buliok offensive” launched by Arroyo in 2003 because a government has captured its several camps including its central camp. The Philippines government policy to cooperate with American campaign in “global war on terror” in 2003 has pursued MILF to open diplomatic offensive rather than the military activity for dealing with the government. MILF must give evidence to the international world that its action of movement does not involve as a terrorist organization. MILF believe that continuing military battle with government troops could make matter worse for MILF itself and brought MILF involve in the list of the foreign terrorist organization as what

Arroyo’s wish. That could harm its purposes and objectives for struggle the Bangsamoro’s demand. Finally, MILF has declared that it is not a terrorist organization otherwise, it is pure a liberation movement and supporting the USA effort to counter terrorism and change its orientation of action from military forced to diplomatic offensive. It was officially stated by its previous leader, Salamat Hashim on June 20, 2003, as follows (Martin and Tuminez, 2008):

“I hereby reiterate our condemnation and abhorrence of terrorist tendencies... [and] reject and deny any link with terrorist organizations or activities in this part of the Asia region, particularly in the Southern Philippines, and elsewhere in the world.”

Murad's statement in 2005 can be interpreted that any possibility form MILF to negotiate political solution with a government for settling Mindanao conflict when it is covering the demand of Bangsamoro people for the right of self-determination and it is not just a simple autonomy system (Amarille, 2006). The MILF has realized that negotiation is the better approach for settling Mindanao conflict. It was assertively stated by Murad about MILF commitment for settling the conflict through negotiation in 2008, as sounded (Kablalan, 2008):

“Let me reiterate to all including the international community that the MILF leadership is very serious and fully committed to resolving the conflict between the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao and the Government of Republic of the Philippines (GRP) through the current peace process.”

The pressure from the international world for both conflicting parties to settle the Mindanao conflict through peaceful settlement becomes the one factor that influenced the conflict settlement of Mindanao conflict through negotiation. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has pursued the GRP and MILF to conduct negotiation for settling Mindanao conflict. It was stated in 27th ICFM

meeting which is held in Kuala Lumpur in 2000, as mentioned (Soliman, 2004):

“Urges the Government of Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to immediately halt its military hostilities and reach a peaceful resolution to the existing problem in Mindanao.”(para. 15, Resolution No. 5/27-P)

The pulling out of military troops of Malaysia as IMT has been seen as the threat to conflicting parties to settles their dispute peacefully and eventually because the progress of peace talk between Philippines government and MILF has turned slowly in recent progress. It was stated by Othman Abdul Rajak, the Chief Malaysian mediator, as reported (Kablalan, 2008 p. 11):

He said Malaysia's decision to start pulling out ceasefire monitors form IMT is “meant to send signal” to Philippine authorities that they should speed up the effort to sign a formal peace pact with the MILF.

GRP and MILF must conduct the negotiation in 2008 if they want to avoid the catastrophe situation happen in Mindanao Island as well as the Philippines as a state during their dispute toward Mindanao conflict. GRP and MILF must

try their best to finish and create any agreement toward ancestral domain to implement the last aspect from the TPA in 2001.

Mutually Enticing Opportunity

The second causal factor that influenced the conflicting parties to conduct negotiation is encompassed in the concept of Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO). Both conflicting parties realized that they can achieve any benefit for their future prospect if they agree to conduct negotiation for settle their dispute from local and international society. The impact of a long-standing conflict and military fighting between GRP and MILF has damaged its political and sustainable of economic development nationally even threat national security. Philippines government cannot stand by itself to recover those problems; it needs other parties to support its rehabilitation and development process on political economic and security matters especially on the affected area of conflict.

The promise of peace in Mindanao has opened the way for new possibilities for the economic development of the region by way of massive government financing and foreign assistance. The United States, Japan, Australia and several Islamic

countries are among the foreign countries raring to pour funding into development projects in Mindanao (PIA Press Release, 2006)

Philippines government will get the benefit for “global war on terror” cooperation with USA for combating the terrorists’ action in the Southern Philippines and the Philippines in general by conducting peaceful settlement with MILF. The existing of the terrorist group has threatened the stability of national security in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the USA government has committed the support on political and financial assistance if both conflicting parties take any progress for settling their dispute through a negotiation process.

Bush has stated that “the United States will provide diplomatic and financial support to renewed peace process” if the MILF will “abandon the path of violence...and addresses its grievances through peaceful negotiations.” (Kablalan, 2008)

The form of cooperation between GRP and USA on global war on terror has opened the big chance for the Philippines in combating resistance movement who tend to use terrorism action and threat the national security. The decline of military

budget during the battle with the Moro Front can be outfitted by the military aid from the USA. The development aid from American government also allocated for the sustainable development of peace processes with MILF on the implantation of ceasefire agreement.

Actually, American government has no direct role in the peace processes between Philippines government and MILF although President Bush has the commitment to give its support for reconciliation process of Mindanao conflict. The US government gives its respect toward the existing of Malaysia as the main actor as the mediator on the peace processes between GRP and MILF. The US State Department engaged with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for facilitating the peace talk processes between GRP and MILF and to assist the national development on social-economic sectors.

“Beyond helping to track and kill terrorists, Washington has promoted economic development in the region and has tried to assist in settling local conflicts

that very often have taken on an Islamic cast. In the southern Philippines, the US has built new classrooms, medical clinics, roads, wells, and other social-welfare projects, spending over \$250 million in aid since 2001.” [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 May, 2007]

In addition to the now \$260 million provided for “development aid” in the last 6 years, the United States gave the Philippines \$250 million in military aid between 2002 and 2006, equivalent to 10% of the military budget. Between October 2007 and September 2008 alone, the United States provided the Philippines with almost \$30 million in financing for military equipment (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 May, 2007) GRP and MILF also enjoy the foreign aid from Japanese government in conducting peaceful settlement through negotiation processes as reported:

An amount of \$1,981,337 came from the Japanese government through JICA as well as from the Japanese sector. Direct Japanese assistance to the GRP-MILF Peace Process has been pouring in. (Solomon, 2007)

Table 1
Donor Assistance toward Mindanao Peace Processes in 2005-2012

Donor Work	Agency
Mindanao Trust Fund for Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP)	Multi-donor trust fund provided by Australia, Canada, European Union, etc
ARMM Social Fund Project (AFSP)	The National Government
Mindanao Rural Development Project 2 (MRDP 2)	World Bank
UN Act for Peace Program	Australian, New Zealand and Spain
Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development Project (J-BIRD)	Japan
The development of peace processes	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Growth with Equity in Mindanao 3 (GEM 3)	USAID

Source: Mindanao Update No.2 September 2007 (World Bank, 2007)

The Australia government has to give development aid through AusAID which is concerned with the Mindanao peace process and joined on the World Bank's multi-donor fund for Mindanao. In 2006, Australia government has launched around US\$50 million in Cotabato city.

The British government has also committed to giving its help toward peace talk processes between Philippines government and MILF. British government will send its expert for giving the assistance and advice during peace talk between GRP and MILF as reported (World Bank, 2007):

The United Kingdom said yesterday that the Philippine and British governments agreed that experts in the Northern Ireland peace process will be sent to the Philippines to give assistance and advice to the peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government.

The existing of Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) mechanism through reconstruction effort and development program of a conflict-affected area in Mindanao engaged with BDA give the contribution to promoting peace processes between Philippines government and MILF.

Total donor contributions deposited in the MTF Program account as of December 31, 2007, amounted to about USD 6 million coming from Australia, Canada, the European Commission, New Zealand, Sweden, and the World Bank. Funds from USAID and the second contribution from EC will be included in next year's MTF account (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007).

Besides that, several Islamic states and Islamic Organizations have a strong commitment to supporting the processes of peace talk and reconciliation of Mindanao conflict. Malaysia and Libya have significant contribution toward the reconciliation processes between GRP and MILF. Media has been reported that Saudi Arabia government has delivered its financial aid for rehabilitation and development project as follows: Sultan Kuadrat Gov. Pax Mangudadatu said the government of Saudi Arabia had already approved the release of \$100 million for Mindanao infrastructure projects and rehabilitation of the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar (Philsol, 2010).

The Iranian government announced its readiness and commitment to support the peace processes between GRP and MILF. The development assistance will focus on the monitoring of ceasefire and various humanitarian project which is concerning for the reducing poverty in the Southern Philippines.

Table 2
Foreign Aid for Mindanao Project (Padilla, 2004)

Selected ODA Project in Mindanao by Donor and Contractor			
Project	Donor	Contractor	Country
Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)	USAID	The Louis Berger Group	New Jersey, USA
Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) Program	USAID	The Louis Berger Group	New Jersey, USA
Micro-Enterprise with Access to Banking Services (MABS)-Mindanao Program	USAID	Chemonics International	Washington DC, USA
Support with Fast Transition (SWIFT) Program	USAID	Development Alternative Inc.	Washington DC, USA
Davao International Airport Development Project (Package II)	ADB	Hanjin Engineering and Construction Company, Ltd.	Japan
Philippines-Japan Friendship Highway Mindanao Section Rehabilitation Project (Phase II)	JBIC	Katahira and Engineers International	Japan
Mindanao Container Terminal Project (Phase I)	JBIC	Mitsubishi-Kawasaki-Toyo Joint Venture	Japan
Solar Power Technology Support to Agrarian Reform Communities Project (SPOT)	Spanish Mixed Credit	BP Solar Espana Eductrade	Spain
Supply, Delivery, and Installation of Medical Equipment for the Zamboanga City Medical Center	Spanish Loan	SA of Madrid Espana	Spain
Sources: Contract under Review by the National Economic Development Authority; US Agency for International Development			

Indeed, MILF re-think that continuing the military fighting with Philippines government will harm its image and its main purpose to reach better life for Bangsamoro people. The continuation armed force will justify the existing ties

between MILF and terrorist movements and loss the support from foreign Islamic states and international communities. According to Taya (2007), MILF wants to continue peace talk with Philippines government because it tries to avoid the

political isolation from the international community. She states that the political isolation from the international community will damage the MILF's image and its credibility as a liberation movement.

Conclusion

The failure of implementation the FPA 1996 has offered the new change for MLF become a legal representative from Bangsamoro. GRP and MILF enhanced the peace talk for solve the Mindanao conflict. Arroyo has invited the MILF for resuming the peace talk and resulting the Tripoli Agreement on Peace in 2001 that cover three major points of issues about security (ceasefire mechanism), humanitarian rehabilitation and development, and ancestral domain aspect. The two of three aspects from Tripoli Agreement on Peace has been implemented by the declaration of the implementing guidelines on security and humanitarian development aspect in 2001 and 2002. The processes of peace talk between GRP and MILF stalled again after the "Buliok Offensive" action in 2003 from AFP under the command of Philippines government to attack the base camp of MILF and the proposal of GRP to USA for including the MILF in the list of the terrorist movement. Nevertheless, these actions did not give any benefit for both conflicting parties. Their armed conflict

brought into the worse condition that threat the Philippines national stability both in politics and social-economic spheres and national security aspect. The experienced of the major battle in 2000 and 2003 pursued both conflicting parties to find another approach to settle their dispute except military offensive. GRP and MILF used negotiation tactics for settle their dispute although there were the stronger hawkish groups within each party who are opposing the processes of peace talk moreover in the recent peace talk of MOA-AD since the late of 2003 until 2008.

According to ripeness theory, there are two concepts that can be used for analyzing the causal factors of GRP-MILF initiative for conducting peaceful settlement toward Mindanao conflict in 2008. Mutually Hurting Stalemate as the first concept explaining that GRP and MILF had realized through cost and benefit calculation the escalating of conflict by armed forced only give the dead loss position for them. It was supported by the fact that the continuation military fighting could decline the politics and social-economic development and threat the national security. The pressure from local and international societies becomes the consideration of both conflicting parties to settle Mindanao

conflict peacefully. The recent of world order that concern on the peaceful world has pursued GRP and MILF to conduct peaceful settlement toward Mindanao Conflict. The continuation of armed battle with Muslim rebel could harm the position of Arroyo and decline her legitimacy. Arroyo also must prevent the potential conflict with Malaysia toward refugees and territorial dispute within the Mindanao Conflict. In the other side, the global war on terror cooperation between GRP and the American government has been pressuring MILF to open diplomatic offensive and resume the peace talk with Philippines government. Moreover, the almost Islamic resistance movement is assumed and closed relation with terrorism action, MILF must think deeper about its position.

The second causal factor for both conflicting parties to conduct the negotiation stage is talking about the Mutually Enticing Opportunity that will be reached by both conflicting parties if they want to go to the negotiation. The foreign states and both local and international community's give their strong commitment to promoting the peace processes on Mindanao conflict when the GRP and MILF continue the peace talk processes for solving the Mindanao conflict. Malaysia through its role as leader of International

Monitoring Team engage with its member has facilitated the ceasefire monitoring between GRP and MILF. It has been followed by foreign states such as USA, Japan, New Zealand, England, Sweden, Australia and other states. GRP and MILF received development assistance toward social-economic and security matter from foreign states and from any organization both IGOs and NGOs as well as World Bank, OIC, the Amnesty International etc when they conduct negotiation for 2008 and create the peaceful condition in Mindanao Island and the Philippines as the whole.

Indeed, it is still far from success to solve the conflict. At least, both conflicting parties performed the willing to prevent the catastrophe situation at that time. Recent development has proven that Mindanao conflict cannot be eased to be solved.

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