

## Analysis of NATO's Military Aid to Ukraine's Military Power in 2022-2023

Joel Jeremis Siburia<sup>1</sup>, Hendra Maujana Saragi<sup>2</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Universitas Nasional, Jakarta

Corresponding Email: [jeremisjoel@gmail.com](mailto:jeremisjoel@gmail.com), [hendramaujanasaragih@gmail.com](mailto:hendramaujanasaragih@gmail.com)

### **Abstract**

#### **Article History:**

Received: April, 2024

Revised: May, 2024

Accepted: June , 2024

Published: July , 2024

*This study aims to answer the question of why foreign military aid, especially from NATO, was given to Ukraine during the 2022-2023. Through a qualitative approach and the concept of Foreign Military Aid, this study analyzes the motivations behind such military aid and its impact on Ukraine's military power. Taking into account the role of non-military forces and civilian participation, the study also explores why NATO want to give a hand in foreign military aid for Ukraine who has affected the dynamics of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. As such, the study provides in-depth insight into the factors driving NATO to provide military assistance to Ukraine in the context of the ongoing conflict in which NATO seeks to maintain NATO's good name and keep stem Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe.*

**Keywords:** *Ukraine, military aid, non-military Froce, the Russia-Ukraine conflict.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 2, 2022 has given panic and losses to Ukraine and the world. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had devastating side effects, such as destroying infrastructure, causing casualties, and also suffering Ukrainian citizens. The damage caused by this invasion is interpreted to reach US \$ 35.3 billion or IDR 542.3 trillion (CNN, 2022). In addition, the impact on the world has caused fuel prices and also world food commodities to soar.

After more than a year has passed, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has no signs of ending, even more tense. Ukraine is still strong enough to hold out to fight for its territory, which is supported with the help of defense equipment and war vehicles by Western countries. Likewise, Russia is still determined to invade Ukraine, even though Russia has not been able to fully control Ukraine. The aid provided by Western countries made Ukraine able to survive the onslaught from Russia so. Peace talks have been held to stop Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but none have succeeded. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also drafted a resolution to be presented to the general assembly to stop Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the draft resolution has also received 11 approvals from members (CNN, 2022). However, even that effort is not enough to stop Russia's ambitions because Russia has veto power, so the resolutions that have been formed will be easy for Russia to reject (ibid).

However, anomalies occurred in this war where Russia as a superpower with strong military power should be able to defeat Ukraine in a short time. Ukraine's strength is very small, but it is able to withstand Russian power. This of course there is another factor that supports Ukraine's combat power which refers to the help of weapons and civilians who are fighting in keeping Ukraine from Russian onslaught. This is certainly inseparable from NATO's role in supporting Ukraine's defense. Therefore, the reasons associated with such assistance are interesting to analyze. That way, this article would like to answer of the research question why NATO is assisting Ukraine in defending its territory is a priority to answer. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of foreign military aid, particularly from NATO countries, on Ukraine's defense capabilities during the 2022-2023 Russia-Ukraine War. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of foreign military aid, particularly from NATO countries, on Ukraine's defense capabilities during the 2022-2023 Russia-Ukraine War. The research aims to understand the contribution of foreign military aid in strengthening Ukraine's military power, as well as to explore the factors that influence foreign countries' decisions to provide such aid.

Moreover, it also aims to identify the motivations behind foreign military aid and to evaluate its effectiveness in helping Ukraine resist Russian aggression. Thus, the aim of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of the role of foreign military assistance in armed conflicts, as well as to highlight the importance of international cooperation in supporting global peace and security.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this literature review, the author reviews previous research made by Ni Made Setiari, Putu Titah Kawitri Resen, Penny Kurnia Putri under the title “Dukungan Amerika Serikat Terkait Penyediaan Military Assistance Bagi Ukraina Dalam Konflik Rusia-Ukraina Tahun 2014-2016”. This study examines that the external assistance provided by the United States to Ukraine in 2014-2016 which continues to increase aims to safeguard its interests in the region with a containment strategy, which is a strategy aimed at protecting the country's security to be free from foreign powers, creating security and prosperity for the people of the country, and also to maintain its influence from the Soviet Union or Russia (Setiari, Resen, Princess, 2022).

Further previous research came from Adeva Alifiobono, Syaiful Anam, Kinanti Rizsa Sabilla in “Analisis Kebijakan Pemberian Bantuan Militer Amerika Serikat Kepada Ukraina Selama Masa Invasi Rusia 2022”. In this study, United States foreign aid is considered effective to help Ukraine withstand Russian combat power and this assistance also aims to suppress strong economic & diplomatic pressure on Russia to immediately end the war (Alifiobono, Anam, Sabilla, 2022). In this study the author will take a different step where in the analysis the author will use data on military strength before and after foreign aid to show the success of foreign military aid. In addition, the authors agree that there is interest that donor countries want to gain in Ukraine, although what distinguishes this study is the time period of the study.

Further research conducted by Chezia Latupeirissa, Novriest Umbu Walangara Nau, Roberto Octovianus Cornelis Seba with the title “Analisis Konflik Rusia Ukraina dan Konflik Internal NATO Menggunakan Siklus Kausalitas”. In this journal found that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will cause disruption to the economy and the emergence of new asylum seekers and will ultimately lead to new criminal cases. Therefore, in this case NATO must participate and help Ukraine to prevent the country from experiencing these negative impacts

In this paper, researchers will use Graham Allison's theory of decision-making. This theory agrees with realist thinkers such as Morgenthau that the state is a rational actor where the state pursues profits and avoids losses (Kusumawardhana, 2021). In analyzing foreign policy, Graham Allison divides his analysis model into three, model 1 as rational actors, model 2 as organizational processes, and model 3 as bureaucratic politics. The researcher in this case will use model 1 which is a rational actor. The theory states that rationality becomes the main capital for stakeholders to do things on the basis of profit and loss of a policy issued In relation to this research, Graham Alison's theory can be used to explain the actions of donors against Ukrainian non-military forces that went to war. Any aid made by other countries always has an interest behind it. Therefore, this theory will be used to explain

**Vol. 09, No. 2, July 2024**

the intentions of the country that helped Ukraine. Since most countries providing military assistance and training civilians are NATO-affiliated countries, this has further raised suspicions of NATO's interests in Ukraine.

Furthermore, researchers also use the concept of Foreign Military Aid, which is a concept where the state gives its military power to help other countries with the aim of improving the defense of other countries or other citizens (Apodaca, 2017). This military assistance itself can take various forms such as assistance to the training of military forces in strategic and tactical terms, as well as foreign assistance in the form of weapons packages or war vehicles. However, Foreign Military Aid itself is often used as part of a country's foreign policy to achieve its national interests. In relation to this study, the authors will use this concept to look at the increase in Ukraine's military power before and after this military assistance was carried out.

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

This study uses a qualitative approach, which is a study that produces descriptive data in the form of written and spoken words of people and observed behavior (Lexy, 2002). This approach can be used to analyze the role of non-military forces and military assistance above descriptively rather than using a quantitative approach that only focuses on numbers. The goal is that the meaning of the case can be understood by the reader clearly and coherently. Furthermore, the nature of the research used in this study is deductive. Deductive research begins with theory first and research later (Mas'ood, 2020). Research with deductive properties can make it easier for researchers because without a theory researchers do not know where the research will start (Ibid).

The data collection technique used in this paper is a literature study obtained from scientific journals with similar topics, international relations books, and also electronic print media. Then, the data obtained are analyzed into scientific generalizations or obtain new scientific knowledge, and can also be useful as a complement to the information that has been collected by the researcher himself. In the end, these data can strengthen existing discoveries or knowledge.

### **IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **THE ROLE OF NATO'S MILITARY AID IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINE WAR 2022-2023**

The invasion carried out by Russia on February 24, 2022 was sudden. However, prior to this attack, NATO satellites had warned of a buildup of forces by Russia on Ukraine's border, but Ukraine did not heed the warning. This invasion has become a massive attack carried out by Russia into Ukraine.

As a result, in 2022 large parts of eastern and northeastern Ukraine have been captured by Russia or at least are undergoing fierce battles for territories, such as Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Izium, Mariupol, Kherson, Snake Island, and Kiev. However, this does not mean that the Russian offensive has not met resistance, the northeastern part of Ukraine pushed back the Russians from the Chernihiv and Sumy regions in March even though the eastern part of Ukraine suffered a total defeat. As a result, in April Russia withdrew its supplies from Chernihiv, Sumy and focused on the Kharkiv region.

In this war, Ukraine's defensive forces can be praised for being able to repulse and pose a threat to Russian forces. Not only did it manage to hit Russia from the Chernihiv and Sumy regions, but Ukraine was also able to take over Snake Island on July 4, 2022 which had Russia no longer focusing its forces on the region on June 30. In addition, Ukraine also attacked the Kerch bridge connecting Russia with Crimea on October 8, 2022, so that Ukraine could seize Crimea which was captured in 2014. Not only did Ukraine take territory back, it also carried out a missile attack on the CGHM Moskva, a Russian warship in the Black Sea, until it sank on April 14. As well as on September 9 an alleged attack from Ukraine that destroyed 8 aircrafts at the Saki air base, Crimea. Ukraine in July 2023 launched missiles at a Russian ammunition depot in Crimea (CNN, 2023). In September Ukraine again attacked Russian naval bases forcing Russia to retreat (apnews.com, 2023). The success of this Ukrainian missile attack was supplied by Britain and France. Likewise, the assistance of short-range ballistic missiles and UAV unmanned aerial vehicles provided by the United States is used to attack Russian air bases and vital Russian territories (Military Balance, 2024).

### **NATO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE 2022-2023**

The actions taken by Russia against Ukraine shocked the world. This triggered a reaction of countries to take action, as NATO became the most influential actor in this war as well. NATO's reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to Russia's miscalculation in its attack. However, NATO does not provide combat troops to participate in the war but rather financial assistance for military packages and training organized to train Ukrainian civilians. From 2022 to 2023 based on data compiled by The Military Balance 2024 shows that Ukraine has received a lot of Foreign Military Aid from countries that are members of NATO.



| Contract Date | Equipment                               | Type  | Qty     | Value (USD) | Contractor  | Funded by                         | Deliveries   |
|---------------|---|---|---------|-------------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Spring 2022   | <i>Marder 1A3*</i>                      | IFV   | 20      | n.k.        | Rheinmetall   | Germany                           | 2023         |
| Apr 2022      | <i>Phoenix Ghost</i>                    | Loitering munition                          | n.k.    | 95m         | Aevox   | US                                | n.k.         |
| Apr 2022      | <i>Senator</i>                          | AUV   | 8       | 1.54m       | Roshel  | Canada                            | 2022         |
| May 2022      | <i>Switchblade 300</i>                  | Loitering munition                          | n.k.    | 22m         | AeroVironment   | US                                | n.k.         |
| May 2022      | APKWS                                   | Laser-guided rocket                         | n.k.    | 64m         | BAE Systems   | US                                | n.k.         |
| Jun 2022      | IRIS-T SLM                              | Medium-range SAM                            | 12      | n.k.        | Diehl   | Germany                           | 2022–ongoing |
| Jun 2022      | LAV 6.0 Armoured Combat Support Vehicle | Wheeled APC                                 | 39      | 188.24m     | GDLS-C  | Canada                            | 2022         |
| Aug 2022      | NASAMS                                  | Medium-range SAM                            | 8 bty   | 1.40bn      | RTX   | US                                | 2023–ongoing |
| Sep 2022      | <i>Switchblade 600</i>                  | Loitering munition                          | n.k.    | 3m          | AeroVironment   | US                                | n.k.         |
| Oct 2022      | <i>Zuzana-2</i>                         | 155mm self-propelled howitzer               | 16      | 96.96m      | KONSTRUKTA-Defence  | Denmark<br>Germany<br>Norway      | 2023–ongoing |
| Nov 2022      | T-72EA*                                 | MBT   | 90      | 90m         | Excalibur Army  | Netherlands<br>US                 | 2022–ongoing |
| Dec 2022      | <i>Skynex</i>                           | 35mm self-propelled air defence artillery   | 8       | n.k.        | Rheinmetall   | Germany                           | 2024         |
| Jan 2023      | CAESAR                                  | 155mm self-propelled howitzer               | 6       | n.k.        | Nexter  | France                            | 2023–24      |
| Jan 2023      | MR-2 <i>Viktor</i>                      | 14.5mm self-propelled air defence artillery | 100     | n.k.        | Excalibur Army  | Netherlands                       | 2023         |
| Jan 2023      | <i>Senator</i>                          | AUV   | 200     | 52.15m      | Roshel  | Canada                            | 2023–ongoing |
| Jan 2023      | TRML-3D                                 | Air-surveillance radar                      | 2       | n.k.        | Hensoldt  | Germany                           | 2023         |
| Jan 2023      | <i>Vampire</i>                          | Point-defence SAM                           | 14      | 40m         | L3Harris  | US                                | n.k.         |
| Feb 2023      | <i>Leopard 1A5*</i>                     | MBT   | 100+    | n.k.        | Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG)<br>Rheinmetall | Denmark<br>Germany<br>Netherlands | 2023–24      |
| May 2023      | TRML-3D                                 | Air surveillance radar                      | 6       | n.k.        | Hensoldt  | Germany                           | 2023–ongoing |
| May 2023      | <i>Marder 1A3*</i>                      | IFV   | 20      | n.k.        | Rheinmetall   | Germany                           | 2023         |
| Jun 2023      | Bv-206*                                 | Tracked APC                                 | 64      | n.k.        | BAE Systems Hägglunds                                     | Germany                           | 2023–ongoing |
| Jun 2023      | <i>Leopard 2A4*</i>                     | MBT   | 14      | 177.03m     | Rheinmetall   | Denmark<br>Netherlands            | 2024         |
| Jun 2023      | NASAMS                                  | Medium-range SAM                            | 2 Inchr | 10.51m      | Kongsberg   | Lithuania                         | 2023         |
| Jul 2023      | NASAMS                                  | Medium-range SAM                            | 4 bty   | n.k.        | RTX   | US                                | n.k.         |
| Aug 2023      | LUNA NG                                 | Light ISR UAV                               | n.k.    | n.k.        | Rheinmetall   | Germany                           | 2023         |
| Aug 2023      | <i>Marder 1A3*</i>                      | IFV   | 40      | n.k.        | Rheinmetall   | Germany                           | 2023         |
| Sep 2023      | CAESAR                                  | 155mm self-propelled howitzer               | 6       | n.k.        | Nexter  | France                            | 2024         |
| Oct 2023      | <i>Terrahawk Paladin</i>                | 35mm self-propelled air defence artillery   | n.k.    | 88m         | MSI-Defence   | UK                                | n.k.         |

\*Second-hand equipment overhauled by industry

bty = batteries. Inchr= launchers.

Source: IISS (2024). *The Military Balance 2024*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group:London. p 162

From the data above, it is obtained that the total funds poured by NATO countries for Ukraine are estimated at 2.3 billion US dollars. This aid is used to increase Ukraine's military strength in fighting, especially in terms of war vehicles and artillery. From the data obtained, there are some significant changes from before and after NATO assistance was carried out, such as Ukraine's Main Battle Tank (MBT) of about 937 units increased to 1141 units after NATO provided about 204 units for Ukraine; Infantry Fighting Vehicle also increased from 1020 to 1100. The most fantastic amount of aid from NATO to Ukraine is the Middle-Range SAM deposited by the United States at a price of 1.40 billion US dollars.

Another important assistance provided by NATO is the training of non-military forces consisting of civilians trained to become military soldiers. The function of this training is as additional state personnel in the fight against Russia. This assistance is effective enough to increase personnel in defending Ukraine. Based on data obtained from Tempo.com, it was obtained that there are 32,000 people who have been trained by the UK from February 2022 to December 2023 to enter the battlefield. The civilian training, called Operation Interflex, was organised by the UK and with assistance from other NATO countries. Civilians are trained within 5 weeks to master basic combat skills, such as inoculation, marksmanship, trench fighting, urban warfare strategy, and physical and mental.

Without the help of civilian forces, Ukraine should not have been able to survive this onslaught for up to 2 years. This can be seen from how limited Ukraine's troops and weaponry are against Russian forces. With the help of NATO military technology, Ukraine was able to push out Russia's Black Sea fleet, limit the Russian air force's space for movement, attack vital Russian spaces, and repulse some Russian forces in several sectors. In doing so, the assistance provided by NATO in the form of weapons or training has had a positive impact on Ukraine's fight against Russia

## **NATO'S INFLUENCE ON RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE**

The security and survival of the country is the main interest of a country, even the entire country. Realism firmly believes in this, all state actions that include the seizure of power and the balancing of forces are aimed at securing national security and ensuring the continued existence of the state. A country whose national security is under threat will certainly fight with all its might to maintain that power, even if it is poor and powerless.

The national security threat Russia receives is due to the expanding expansion of the United States and its NATO allies into Eastern Europe. NATO itself has controlled part of the former Soviet Union countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (NATO, 2020) NATO's expansion to the countries of the

Vol. 09, No. 2, July 2024

former Soviet Union certainly threatens Russia's security because countries that are members of NATO as official members will get security assistance and weapons from NATO, meaning NATO has the right to provide and build forces in the country such without violating international law. That way, if NATO controls the countries of the former Soviet Union, especially countries directly neighboring Russia, then NATO will easily put high-destructive defense equipment on the border that leads directly to vital Russian buildings, so that all Russian actions can be influenced by NATO actions.

This is what provoked Russia's action to invade Ukraine. Ukraine is located close to Russia's strategic region, the capital Moscow, and if this strategic location is used by Russia's enemies then this clearly threatens Russia's national security. In addition, so far Ukraine has not had a clear direction between Russia and the European Union, making Russia wary of the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. NATO itself has long been in rapprochement with Ukraine and so does Ukraine, which tends to side with NATO over Russia. This increases the probability of Ukraine falling to NATO.

Ukraine is very close to the Russian capital and of course near the border there are vital areas of Russia, such as military bases and nuclear weapons, and if Ukraine joins the European Union, especially NATO, then NATO will be free to put military bases, artillery, or other weapons that have great power, on the Ukrainian border that will lead directly to that vital region. If Ukraine officially joins the European Union and becomes a member of NATO, Russia will be surrounded by Western powers, namely the countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine which are directly adjacent to the capital Moscow. Therefore, Russia opposes NATO's plan to include Ukraine in 2008 and will always be aggressive when it hears about it. As evidence, Putin as the president of Russia himself conveyed the purpose of his Invasion in the Russian Victory speech on February 24, 2022, stating (Tommy: 2022):

*"I spoke of our greatest concerns and concerns, and of the underlying threat created by Western politicians.... I am referring to NATO's eastward expansion, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to Russia's borders. ... Further expansion of NATO infrastructure and the beginning of military development on the territory of Ukraine are unacceptable to us. ... For our country, this is a matter of life and death, a matter of the future of our history as a nation."*

In addition to his speech on February 24, 2022, the speech on May 9, 2022 still stated the same reason, namely (Tommy:2022):

*"I repeat – we see how the military infrastructure is being developed, how hundreds of foreign advisers are starting to work, there are regular deliveries of the most modern weapons from the regular deliveries of the most modern weapons from NATO countries."*



Putin's speech made explicit his reasons for invading Ukraine: his concern about NATO expansion. This endangers the security and survival of his country, so Putin willingly or unwillingly has to move to secure it immediately.

### **NATO'S INTEREST IN UKRAINE IN MILITARY AID**

Ukraine is a former territory of the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine declared itself an independent state. However, Ukraine's existence is still very important for Russia as it connects areas that were former Soviet Union control back to it. Russia must also be faced with conditions where Ukraine is reluctant to rejoin Russia and shows a turning direction to take an alliance with NATO rather than Russia. This happened in 2004 under the leadership of Viktor Yuschenko. For NATO, Ukraine could be used to pressure Russia not to expand its influence. That way Russia cannot return to its glory days like the Soviet Union used to. Even so, NATO also did not act rashly when Viktor Yuschenko asked to join NATO, even until 2022 Ukraine's status in NATO is still in question. However, after Russia's invasion of Ukriana, it seems that helping Ukraine in a military package is necessary because it can show NATO as heroic to contain Russian power. NATO seems to always be reliable when countries neighboring Russia are threatened by Russia. This is necessary so that the countries of the former USSR do not return to Russia and build confidence that NATO will help those who put hope in it. Ukraine itself has been hoping for NATO since 2004 and if NATO does not provide support to Ukraine it will tarnish NATO's good name and this will have an impact on NATO's power base in Eastern Europe which is slowly losing trust in NATO. Eastern European countries that are united with NATO have a special reason for joining, which is to eliminate Russia's influence in the country, so they put full hope on NATO to provide assistance. If NATO itself does not provide assistance and only uses NATO countries in Eastern Europe as pawns to dispel Russian hegemony, the consequence will be a decline in their trust in NATO. Ultimately to maintain that trust, NATO willingly or unwillingly has to provide assistance to Ukraine. With this assistance, NATO shows that it cares about the country that yearns for NATO and will support that country.

The latest facts are increasingly interesting to prove the argument above, namely the design of military aid to Ukraine for 2024 which has been set by the United States Senate at 40 billion US dollars (Kaufman, Foran, & Zaslav2024). The United States, as a country with great influence in NATO, can even be called a roll model for NATO and the European Union, still focused on helping Ukraine even though the United States is currently being hit by two things, namely helping Israel, his good friend, and the focus of his president in the upcoming elections. In this case, these two things alone will fundamentally shake the United States' policy to continue supporting Ukraine, even more so when the

**Vol. 09, No. 2, July 2024**

United States changes the president needs to force President Joe Biden to take serious steps against his policies after American protests against military aid to Ukraine.

Furthermore, Ukraine itself is the food granary of Europe, even the world because Ukraine is able to produce large amounts of wheat (Reuters 2022). When food has been controlled by Russia, the enemy can easily play tricks on the opponent easily. Food is a basic need that needs attention, even the famous art of war Sun Tzu considered food as an important aspect in warfare. Therefore, this is certainly Ukraine's bargaining side to get help from NATO even in large quantities.

For these reasons, aid to Ukraine is important or NATO could lose face if it does not act. However, providing NATO with a military package in the form of training weapons is sufficient. If NATO dares to go further, it will violate international law and bring the conflict to a more serious problem, so for now the military aid package is enough to help Ukraine from Russia.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War 2022-2023, foreign military aid, especially from NATO countries, has played a vital role in strengthening Ukraine's defenses and helping them withstand Russian attacks. Through the analysis of the concept of Foreign Military Aid and civilian participation, the aid has had a significant impact on Ukraine's military power. Although diplomatic efforts have been hampered by Russia's veto, foreign military aid remains an important factor in the conflict. International cooperation in the form of military assistance emphasizes the importance of solidarity between countries in facing threats to the sovereignty and security of a country.

In addition, the study also underscores the complexity of political dynamics and national interests involved in providing foreign military assistance. The motivations behind such aid can vary, ranging from strategic importance to moral commitment to support a country struggling against external aggression. NATO cannot simply leave Ukraine without providing military support even if it is detrimental to NATO, because this will result in the loss of confidence of NATO countries located in parts of Eastern Europe in NATO's credibility in its efforts to contain Russian power in Eastern Europe. In addition, Ukraine is an important region for world food so the aid is needed to anticipate the threat posed by Russia with the largest wheat region in the world, Ukraine. The Author suggest, that NATO's military contain interest to maintain NATO's domination in East Europe so Ukraine should be prepare for the consequens.

## **VI. REFERENCES**

1. IISS (2023). *The Military Balance 2023*. Routledge Tylor & Francis Group: London
2. Jackson & Sorensen. (2013). *Pengantar Studi Hubungan Internasional: Teori dan Pendekatan*, edisi kelima. Diterjemahkan oleh Dadan Ruryadiputra. Penerbit: PUSTAKA PELAJAR. Yogyakarta.
3. Kusumawardhana, I. (2021). *Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri*. Pustaka Ilmu: Yogyakarta.
4. Plokhly, S. (2015). *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*. (New York: Basic Books).
5. Mearsheimer. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politic*. ( New York, W. W. Norton & Company), hlm xi.
6. Lexy, m. (2002). *Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung : CV. Remaja.
7. Mas'ood, M. (2020). *Metodologi Hubungan Internasional: Disiplin dan Metodologi*. Jakarta : LP3S.
8. Yekelchyk, S (2020). *Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press
9. Adeva Alifiobono, Syaiful Anam, Kinanti Rizsa Sabilla. (2022). Analisis Kebijakan Pemberian Bantuan Militer Amerika Serikat Kepada Ukraina Selama Masa Invasi Rusia 2022. *IJPSS: Indonesian Journal of Peace and Security Studies* e-ISSN 2614-672X Vol. 5 Ed. 2
10. Chezia, Novriest, Roberto (2023). Analisis Konflik Rusia Ukraina dan Konflik Internal NATO Menggunakan Siklus Kausalitas. *INNOVATIVE: Journal Of Social Science Research* Volume 3
11. Kartini, Indriana. (2014). Aneksasi Rusia di Ukraina dan Konsekuensi bagi Ukraina. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* Vol 11, nomor 2. Jakarta.
12. Apodaca, Clair. 'Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool'. Oxfordre, 26 April 2017. Diakses melalui <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332>
13. Brown, David. (2022). "Ukraina Diserang Rusia Dalam Peta: Rusia Menggempur Target Kota-kota Baru. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-60518821.amp>.
14. Suarakupangfm.com (2022). Ukraina Sebut Kerusakan Lingkungan Akibat Invasi Rusia Tembus Rp543 T. <http://suarakupangfm.com/ukraina-sebut-kerusakan-lingkungan-akibat-invasi-rusia-tembus-rp542-t/>
15. CNN. (2022). "Rusia Veto Resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB Atas Invasi di Ukraina". <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20220226102501-134-764371/rusia-veto-resolusi-dewan-keamanan-pbb-atas-invasi-di-ukraina>,

16. Evanalina, Sadryna. (2022). "Pidato Lengkap Vladimir Putin di Perayaan Hari Kemenangan Rusia". <https://www.kompas.tv/article/287260/pidato-lengkap-vladimir-putin-di-perayaan-hari-kemenangan-rusia>.
17. Getmanchuk, A. (2020). Russia as aggressor, NATO as objective: Ukraine's new National Security Strategy <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-as-aggressor-nato-as-objective-ukraines-new-national-security-strategy/>
18. Iswara, Aditya. (2022). "Sejarah Hubungan Ukraina dengan NATO". <https://internasional.kompas.com/read/2022/02/26/130400270/sejarah-hubungan-ukraina-dengan-nato?page=3>.
19. Kaufman, Foran, & Zaslav. (2024). Senate Votes to Pass \$40 Billion Ukraine Aid Package. CNBC: <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/senate-vote-ukraine-aid-package/index.html>
20. NATO. Relations with Ukraine. Accessed from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_37750.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm) NATO. (2020). NATO Member Countries. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato\\_countries.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm),
21. Neuman, Scott. (2017). "Ukraine Recommits To NATO Membership Over Moscow's Objections". National Public Radio (NPR). Accessed from <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/10/536450855/ukraine-recommits-to-nato-membership-over-moscows-objections>
22. Putri, Diva. (2022). "Sejarah Konflik Rusia Vs Ukraina". <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2022/02/25/060500265/sejarah-konflik-rusia-vs-ukraina>
23. Popescu, George. (2011). "Politica externă a României și relațiile cu Blocul sovietic". [http://www.romania-actualitati.ro/politica\\_externa\\_a\\_romaniei\\_si\\_relatiile\\_cu\\_blocul\\_sovietic-29341](http://www.romania-actualitati.ro/politica_externa_a_romaniei_si_relatiile_cu_blocul_sovietic-29341),
24. Iswara, Aditya. (2022). "Sejarah Hubungan Ukraina dengan NATO". <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2022/02/25/060500265/sejarah-konflik-rusia-vs-ukraina>.
25. Litvinova (2023). A Ukrainian Missile Strikes The Headquarters Of Russia's Navy In Crimea. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-fcab4c6f0bd3738b34f9032cbef0833f>
26. Puspaningrum, Bernadatte. (2022). "Gas dan Minyak Rusia: Berapa Besar Ketergantungan Dunia Padanya?". <https://www.kompas.com/global/read/2022/05/26/072900070/gas-dan-minyak-rusia--berapa-besar-ketergantungan-dunia-padanya>.
27. Rahman, Raditya. (2016). Aneksasi Krimea oleh Rusia. (Skripsi, Universitas Jember, 2016), hlm 39. <http://repository.unej.ac.id/handle/123456789/77804>.

28. Reuters (2022). Uni Eropa Berusaha Pulihkan Ekspor gandum Ukraina yang Terhambat. VOA:<https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/uni-eropa-berusaha-pulihkan-ekspor-gandum-ukraina-yang-terhambat/6624506.html>
29. Sorangan, Tommy. (2022). “Simak! Alasan Lengkap Putin Mengapa Serang Ukraina”. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220302192528-4-319689/simak-alasan-lengkap-putin-mengapa-serang-ukraina>.
30. Sorangan, Tommy. (2022). “Update Terkini: Ini Wilayah Ukraina yang Telah Dikuasai Rusia”. <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220302094737-4-319452/update-terkini-ini-wilayah-ukraina-yang-telah-dikuasai-rusia>.
31. Voitovych (2023). Massive Blasts At Russian Depot In Crimea Force Thousands To Flee. <https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/19/europe/russia-ukraine-crimea-depot-explosion-intl/index.html>